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ABSTRACT 
 
Beliefs about Memory in Compulsive Checking and Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder: Assessment and Intervention 
 
Gillian M. Alcolado, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2014  
 
Checking is one of the most common compulsions in obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD).  Some have suggested that individuals who check 
repeatedly may have memory deficits, but findings of memory-related 
investigations have been inconsistent.  In contrast, beliefs about memory have 
been shown to relate closely to checking behaviour.  Thus, it is possible that 
mixed findings regarding the presence of memory deficits in association with 
OCD may be related to maladaptive beliefs influencing performance.  Currently 
no measure exists to assess these beliefs, nor does an intervention to improve 
them, despite the existence of such measures and interventions for other known 
maladaptive beliefs central to OCD.  The present studies were thus designed to 
measure and examine the relationships between beliefs about memory, actual 
memory performance, and checking compulsions.  The first study encompassed 
the development of the Beliefs About Memory Inventory (BAMI) to assess 
maladaptive beliefs that individuals hold about their memory.  Non-clinical (N = 
697) and clinical (N = 24) participants completed the candidate items for the 
BAMI along with other relevant questionnaires to determine its psychometric 
properties.  Results showed that the psychometrically-sound measure is comprised 
of two factors: beliefs about memory ability, and beliefs about the importance of 
memory.  Furthermore, the BAMI was able to predict checking symptoms over 
and above existing belief domains known to be relevant to OCD.  The second 
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study examined whether a brief cognitive intervention designed to improve beliefs 
about memory in a sample of compulsive checkers could decrease checking and 
increase memory performance.  Individuals with OCD (N = 24) who exhibited 
clinical levels of checking symptoms monitored their checking behaviour over the 
course of a two-session intervention.  Half were randomly assigned to the 
treatment condition, while the other half were randomly assigned to a waitlist 
control condition.  Participants also completed neuropsychological tests pre- and 
post-treatment/waitlist.  Results demonstrated that compared to those in the 
waitlist condition, individuals in the treatment condition decreased their 
maladaptive beliefs about memory, checking behaviour, and symptoms, while 
increasing their memory performance.  The results of these studies are discussed 
in the context of implications for cognitive-behavioural theories of and 
interventions for OCD. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between intrusive thoughts, obsessions, compulsions, and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder 
Unwanted thoughts, images, or impulses that come to mind unbidden, are 
incredibly prevalent (Rachman & de Silva 1978; Radomsky et al., 2014).  
Common intrusive thoughts and impulses reported by non-clinical participants 
include the urge to jump off a platform/in front of a moving vehicle, thoughts of 
harming others, or the image of engaging in unwanted sexual acts (Rachman & de 
Silva, 1978).  It is understood that it is the misinterpretation of the significance of 
these thoughts as having personal importance that leads to the development of 
obsessions (Rachman, 1997; 1998), which are unwanted intrusive thoughts 
images or impulses that occur frequently and cause significant distress and 
anxiety (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).  As such, although 
most individuals have unwanted intrusive thoughts that occur seemingly out of 
the blue that are similar in content to those reported by individuals with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), those who interpret the thoughts 
negatively as highly important and personally significant will be at further risk of 
developing OCD (Rachman, 1997).  Indeed it has been demonstrated in a large 
international study of undergraduate participants that unwanted intrusions which 
are appraised in such a fashion and/or which individuals try to control, are 
associated with the most distress (Moulding et al., 2014).  The most frequently 
reported intrusive thoughts are those associated with doubt (Radomsky et al., 
2014).  As such, doubt and related constructs will remain a focus throughout this 
introduction.  
Intrusions often lead to neutralizing behaviours, i.e., compulsions, which 
are intended to reduce the distress caused by these thoughts, images and/or 
impulses (Salkovskis, 1985).  In the case of doubt, these intrusions often involve 
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whether one has properly secured and/or checked locks, doors, and/or household 
appliances.  The presence of repeated obsessions and/or compulsions that cause 
distress and interference in one’s daily life are required for a diagnosis of OCD, 
considered until recently to be an anxiety disorder (APA, 2000), and which now 
comprises its own spectrum of related disorders (APA, 2013).  Regardless of how 
OCD is classified, this disorder has received much theoretical, research, and 
clinical attention in part because of the often severe consequences for those who 
suffer from it.  OCD can dramatically reduce quality of life for the individual 
(Eisen et al., 2006), and can equally cause immense interference in the lives of 
their loved ones (Cicek, Cicek, Kayhan, Uguz, & Kaya, 2013). 
Heterogeneity of OCD 
OCD can take many forms, and can involve few, or many different types 
of obsessions/compulsions (Radomsky & Taylor, 2005).  OCD can be defined by 
specific concerns such as possessing a fear of contamination, a specific behaviour 
such as checking, or a specific attribute such as indecisiveness (Thordarson et al., 
2004).  As such, some have proposed that these symptoms are better viewed as 
existing along different dimensions (for a review, see Mataix-Cols, Rosario-
Campos, & Leckman, 2005).  The existence of checking, washing and other 
rituals, and impulses, as separate symptom domains has been supported by factor 
analytic methods (e.g., Wu & Carter, 2008).  Another common symptom domain, 
hoarding, is now considered a separate diagnostic category (APA, 2013; Mataix-
Cols et al., 2010; Rachman, Elliott, Shafran, & Radomsky, 2009).  The frequency 
and combination of these symptom presentations differ drastically (Pinto et al., 
2006).  While the majority of sufferers report four or more symptom types 
concurrently, compulsive checking is one of the most commonly reported 
symptoms in individuals with a lifetime history of OCD (Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & 
Kessler, 2010), perhaps not surprisingly given the prevalence of doubting-related 
concerns in the general population (Radomsky et al., 2014).   
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Neuropsychology and OCD 
 Neuropsychological investigations have been undertaken in an attempt to 
more fully understand OCD.  An early review on neuropsychological 
performance in OCD suggested that there were small but measurable 
neuropsychological deficits in individuals with OCD with respect to executive 
function, motor and non-verbal memory abilities (e.g., Tallis, 1997).  Although 
there was a lack of aetiological evidence to suggest these were causal factors in 
OCD, the possibility of memory dysfunction playing a role in the disorder, 
particularly with respect to doubt and compulsive checking, seemed a logical and 
parsimonious supposition.  If one could clearly and accurately remember 
checking, surely one would not need to return to check again.  The sample of 
individuals tested, however, did not necessarily have primary checking 
compulsions (Tallis, 1997).  Another study by Savage and colleagues (1999) 
demonstrated that the memory impairments observed in OCD were likely due to 
deficits in strategy during encoding of visual memory, although again, the authors 
sampled a heterogeneous OCD population, and their investigation did not allow 
for any conclusions regarding causation.  More recently, Muller & Roberts (2005) 
reviewed the literature on neuropsychology and OCD and concluded it was 
largely mixed.  Although there was stronger evidence for a visual rather than a 
verbal memory deficit, the most consistent finding was that low memory 
confidence was symptomatic of OCD (Muller & Roberts, 2005).  Further, they 
noted that low memory ability did not seem to account for checking in 
compulsive checking populations.  They concluded by recommending that future 
studies examine checkers specifically, account for memory confidence, and use 
longitudinal methods to clarify causation (Muller & Roberts, 2005).  Interestingly, 
compulsive checkers in particular have been found to report less memory 
confidence (but not exhibit poorer memory performance) than non-checking 
obsessive-compulsives or controls (Tolin et al., 2001).  Thus, the doubt they 
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experience may be unfounded.  A recent meta-analysis by Abramovitch, 
Abramowitz, and Mittelman (2013), containing studies conducted on 
heterogeneous samples of adult and child OCD cases, found that none of the 
previously documented memory impairments were of clinical significance.   
Other research has found individuals with OCD to have superior memory 
abilities.  Individuals with OCD have been found to have superior memory for 
particularly for threatening information (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; 
Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001).  This result has been found in studies 
of compulsive washers (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999) and compulsive checkers 
(Cougle et al., 2008; Radomsky et al., 2001).   
These mixed findings on memory ability in OCD, combined with evidence 
of decreased memory confidence, have led some to suggest that perhaps memory 
confidence may interfere with memory performance (Cougle, Salkovskis, & 
Wahl, 2007; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010).  These suppositions are in line with 
related research which has found that rather than having deficits in reality 
monitoring, i.e., the process in differentiating reality from imagination 
(Rubenstein, Peynircioglu, Chambless, & Pigott, 1993), individuals with OCD 
only differed from controls with respect to reality monitoring confidence (Cougle 
et al., 2008; Hermans, Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003; McNally & 
Kohlbeck, 1993).   
Interventions for OCD 
Numerous treatments have been developed to reduce the symptoms and 
suffering associated with OCD, including, but not limited to, doubt and 
compulsive checking.  Pharmacological treatments exist, although they only help 
about 60% of individuals (see Fineberg, Reghunandanan, Brown, & Pampaloni, 
2012, for a review).  The first effective psychological therapy for OCD, exposure 
and response prevention, has existed since the 1960’s (Meyer, 1966), and has long 
been considered an extremely effective and empirically supported intervention 
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(Chambless et al., 1998).  It is a primarily behavioural approach whereby 
individuals are asked to face situations that provoke their obsessive thoughts and 
are then instructed to refrain from engaging in their compulsive/neutralizing 
behaviour (Meyer, 1966).  As such, it can be very easily applied to compulsive 
checking, for example, by requiring individuals to use electrical or gas-powered 
appliances and to then refrain from checking whether or not they have properly 
turned them off.  This intervention, although efficacious and recommended as a 
first line of treatment (Podea, Suciu, Suciu, & Ardelean, 2009), is unfortunately 
marked by high dropout rates (e.g., Foa et al., 2005); and low levels of 
acceptability (e.g., Milosevic & Radomsky, 2013).  Thus, there is clearly room for 
improvement.   
Similar to Beck’s cognitive model of depression and subsequent 
intervention (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), interventions based more on 
cognitive belief domains in OCD (see below; e.g., Clark, 2003; Rachman, 2003) 
have been developed.  They allow for a focus on ‘in the moment’ 
interpretations/appraisals of a situation which gives rise to 
obsessions/compulsions, as well as the ability to target more long-standing, 
overarching distorted beliefs which make such thoughts/behaviours (including 
doubt/checking) more likely to occur.  Unfortunately, there is currently a lack 
evidence to suggest such a focus in OCD treatment improves efficacy (Clark, 
2005), although a recent meta-analysis suggests a more cognitive approach is 
equivalently effective to the earlier behavioural approach (Rosa-Alcásar, 
Sánchez-Meca, Gómez-Conesa, & Marín-Martínez, 2008).  Regardless of which 
method is superior, all psychological interventions continue to lack large scale 
effectiveness, and exhibit low response rates (e.g., 48% Haland et al., 2010; 50% 
Jonsson, Hougaard, & Bennedsen; 2011; 59% Whittal et al., 2010).  No trials 
have specifically examined the efficacy of a protocol for compulsive checking, 
although one has been suggested (Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey, & Rachman, 
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2010), which includes a module that examines memory confidence; preliminary 
testing of this approach is now underway. 
Given the body of neuropsychological literature on OCD, a relative dearth 
still exists with respect to neurocognitive change following treatment, particularly 
with respect to mechanisms of change.  Further, none of the studies which do 
measure memory were conducted specifically within the context of compulsive 
checkers, for whom such a deficit may have some theoretical grounding.  Kuelz 
and colleagues (2006) found that neuropsychiatric performance, including 
visuospatial memory, improved in a heterogeneous OCD sample from pre- to 
post-implementation of a 12-week cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) protocol.  
Indeed, they found that post-treatment, performance improved to become 
equivalent to that of a non-clinical control sample, but they did not examine the 
possible mechanisms by which these changes occurred.  Others (e.g., Kang et al., 
2003) have focused on which cortical glucose metabolic changes (measured by 
positron emission tomography), rather than potential psychological changes, were 
associated with improvements in visuospatial memory following treatment.  
(They found decreases in orbital-frontal circuit activity, an area related to 
visuospatial memory and executive functioning, commonly over-activated in 
OCD as compared to controls.)  Another study examining changes in 
neuropsychiatric scores following pharmacotherapy found no change (Nielen & 
Den Boer, 2003), which suggests that perhaps if cognitions are not targeted then 
performance cannot improve.   
Distorted beliefs in OCD 
Distorted beliefs have long been recognized to be central to OCD, 
particularly those relating to responsibility - the first to be described (Salkovskis, 
1985) and tested (e.g., Lopatka & Rachman, 1995).  Others, including those 
associated with the catastrophic misinterpretations of the meaning of thoughts, 
account for the development of obsessions (Rachman, 1997; 1998).  We now 
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know that other maladaptive beliefs are also implicated in OCD symptomatology, 
as established by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group 
(OOCWG, 2005).  Although not necessarily specific to OCD, these include 
beliefs about inflated sense of responsibility and overestimation of threat, the 
importance of and control over thoughts, and perfectionism and intolerance of 
uncertainty (OCCWG, 2005).   
Based on the neuropsychological literature reviewed above, it seems that 
individuals with compulsive checking often appraise themselves as having poor 
memory in checking and memory-related situations, resulting in low memory 
confidence.  Such thoughts might be more likely to occur in individuals with 
distorted beliefs about their memory ability.  The OCCWG ultimately decided not 
to include beliefs about memory early on in their process (OCCWG, 1997), and as 
such, research in this particular domain is lacking.   
Of course there are other models/treatments of OCD not based on the 
premise that a range of appraisals/distorted beliefs are responsible for its 
development. These include the inference-based approach, which is a therapy 
focused on challenging errors of logic made regarding the thoughts, rather than 
the interpretations of the specific thoughts (see O’Connor & Robillard, 1999).  
Similarly, meta-cognitive therapy proposes that distorted meta-cognitions, rather 
than cognitions themselves, are central in OCD development and therefore 
treatment (e.g., Fisher & Wells, 2008).  In line with information processing 
theories of psychopathology, it has been proposed that deficits in inhibiting 
attention to irrelevant information (originating with Enright & Beech, 1993a,b, 
and elaborated on by Harkin and Kessler [2009] as a component of faulty working 
memory processes in this population) are what drive OCD. Finally, there is an 
intervention known as Danger Ideation Reduction Therapy which focuses 
exclusively on re-evaluating checking situations as non-threatening (e.g., 
Vaccaro, Jones, Menzies, & Wootton, 2010), rather than examining more general 
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faulty appraisals.  However, given that the faulty appraisal model is the 
predominant model on which the majority of modern treatments are based, it was 
used to form the basis of this thesis. 
Memory confidence, beliefs about memory, and compulsive checking 
It is thus proposed that a generally held belief that one has a poor, bad, or 
otherwise impaired memory will predispose individuals to make interpretations of 
their memory as not good and to exhibit low memory confidence for their actions 
while checking.  This in turn could lead one to be more likely to compulsively 
check in potentially threatening situations.  I will now turn first to the theoretical 
underpinnings and then to the research evidence which supports investigations of 
beliefs about memory, as they pertains to compulsive checking.   
Cognitive theory of compulsive checking.  A cognitive theory pertaining 
specifically to compulsive checking has been developed (Rachman, 2002), which 
implicates distorted beliefs about memory in the maintenance of checking.  
Rachman (2002) proposed that checking transpires when one experiences a 
perceived increase in personal responsibility for preventing harm, under 
circumstances where one cannot be sure that the harm has been successfully 
prevented.  Rachman (2002) proposed three cognitive multipliers that were 
posited to contribute to compulsive checking: 1) increased perceived 
responsibility for preventing harm, 2) increased perceived probability of said 
harm, and 3) increased perceived seriousness of the potential harm.  It was 
suggested that over time, checking behaviour further increases the sense of 
personal responsibility, as well as perceptions of the probability and severity of 
the harm.  It was theorized that checking lacks a clear end-point, as it is unlikely 
for one to achieve complete certainty that one has completely avoided all possible 
future catastrophic outcomes that could occur were the checking not to take place.  
Finally, checking was suggested to be maintained by the paradoxical nature of the 
act itself: checking was proposed to begin due to uncertainty/doubt, but rather 
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than alleviate doubt, the act of checking was posited to actually increase 
uncertainty.  Although some would suggest that treatments should therefore 
simply target intolerance of uncertainty, a more parsimonious approach would 
suggest that it is the combination of these factors which creates a self-perpetuating 
cycle of checking (Rachman, 2002).  Crucially, this theory states that the 
increased doubt caused by checking erodes memory confidence appraisals over 
time (Rachman, 2002), and thus implies that distorted beliefs about memory may 
play a role in maintaining compulsive checking. 
Evidence for the erosion of memory confidence.  In line with 
Rachman’s (2002) theory proposing that compulsive checking erodes confidence 
over time, a meta-memorial (i.e., thoughts and beliefs about memory) mechanism 
underlying this process has also been suggested (van den Hout and Kindt, 
2003a,b; 2004).  As checking becomes a repeated, habitual act it is proposed to 
cause a shift from high (perceptual) to lower level (semantic) processing, which 
results in less vivid and detailed encoding of the check (van den Hout & Kindt, 
2004).  This shift creates the difference between a memory that is specifically 
“remembered” as compared to information which is just more generally and 
vaguely “known” (see Tulving, 1985).  Thus, when one attempts to retrieve the 
memory for the check, it does not feel as reliable and low memory confidence 
results (van den Hout & Kindt, 2004).  This is particularly problematic for those 
with compulsive checking, who have high standards for accuracy, completion, 
and certainty, and prefer to rely on “remembering” exactly what they have done, 
rather than just a vague “knowing”, (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003b).  This view 
has been supported by experimental evidence, as repeated checking has indeed 
been found to cause decreased memory vividness, detail, and confidence by a 
number of independent researchers (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Coles, 
Radomsky, & Horng, 2006; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010; Radomsky, Dugas, 
Alcolado, & Lavoie, 2014, Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; van den Hout 
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& Kindt, 2003a,b; 2004).  Thus it is possible that over time, individuals who 
check may come to believe they have a poor memory. 
Evidence for the impact of beliefs about memory on compulsive 
checking.  Not only does checking diminish memory confidence/beliefs about 
one’s memory ability (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a), such beliefs have now 
been found to predict and even cause checking.  A psychometric investigation 
demonstrated that low meta-cognitive confidence, (as assessed by a measure that 
included a subscale of memory confidence), predicted checking beyond the 
typical maladaptive beliefs central to OCD (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007).   
Another more recent psychometric investigation found the interaction between 
beliefs about memory and other OCD-relevant beliefs to better predict checking 
symptoms than anxiety or depression (Cuttler, Alcolado, & Taylor, 2013).  
Additionally, an experimental investigation that manipulated beliefs about 
memory using a false-feedback paradigm for memory test performance, found 
that individuals who were led to believe they had a poor memory had 
subsequently higher urges to check on later tasks than individuals who were told 
they had a good memory (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011).  This experimental 
finding was also recently replicated and extended by manipulating beliefs about 
prospective memory ability (Cuttler, Sirois-Delisle, Alcolado, Radomsky, & 
Taylor, 2013).  Therefore a focus on beliefs about memory, through careful 
assessment of this construct, may provide a fuller understanding of the aetiology 
of OCD and open avenues for possible treatment strategies and enhancements. 
Measurement of beliefs about memory   
The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire was developed to assess distorted 
beliefs central to OCD, but it does not assess beliefs about memory (OCCWG, 
2005).  Examinations of changes in meta-cognition, including confidence in 
memory, and reality monitoring in OCD (e.g., Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007; 
Hermans et al., 2003) have led, however, to the development of measures which 
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do assess constructs related to beliefs about memory.  All of the questionnaires 
described below contain items which assess memory confidence, in conjunction 
with assessment of confidence other domains, such as attention and perception.  
One such measure, the Brief Cognitive Confidence Questionnaire, has been 
developed but not validated, as it was not intended for broader use (Hermans et 
al., 2008).  Others which have been validated are the Memory and Cognitive 
Confidence Scale (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007), and the Meta-Cognitions 
Questionnaire, which was originally developed to assess worry in the context of 
generalized anxiety disorder (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), but has been 
found to have some applicability to OCD (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  
Thus, there is currently no measure that includes a focused assessment of beliefs 
about memory intended specifically for use in the study of OCD.  This is not ideal 
for investigations which would seek to better understand the role of these beliefs 
in compulsive checking.  Furthermore, there may be beliefs about memory 
beyond those related to memory ability (as assessed via a number of memory 
confidence items) which could be pertinent to the development/maintenance of 
compulsive checking.  For example, the role of personal significance is known to 
be related to obsessive-compulsive symptomatology (Rachman, 1997; 1998), 
therefore I included questions pertaining to beliefs about the importance of 
memory.  Relatedly, I measured the degree to which one might believe that 
memory is/should be a reliable entity, since if memory is believed to be fallible, 
then believing one’s memory is poor might have less personal significance.     
Rationale and implications for the current program of research 
In summary, compulsive checking is an extremely common symptom of 
OCD, a disorder which causes significant distress and whose interventions lack 
wide scale effectiveness.  Beliefs about memory appear to be implicated in 
checking and indeed may interfere with memory performance, but current 
assessment tools do not capture this construct, nor do current evidence-based 
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interventions target this domain.  Thus, I developed a scale (Study 1) to assess 
beliefs about memory, and a cognitive intervention module to diminish these 
beliefs (Study 2), to determine whether such a therapy could decrease checking 
and increasing memory performance.  The implications of this research are 
threefold.  Firstly, a measure that directly assesses beliefs about memory would 
facilitate the assessment of this construct, both for research and clinical practice 
applications, and allow for a better understanding of the beliefs about memory 
that impact checking behaviour.  Secondly, examining the effectiveness of a 
cognitive-behavioural intervention for maladaptive beliefs about memory would 
not only add to the evidence for the effect of beliefs about memory on checking, 
but could also increase the effectiveness of CBT for compulsive checking, by 
adding a potential new focus for intervention.  Finally, studying the relationship 
between beliefs about memory and memory performance would help to clarify 
whether compulsive checking is associated with memory deficits, or whether 
obsessive-compulsive beliefs about memory are more closely linked to memory 
performance. 
Design 
 Study 1 was a psychometric investigation.  A large sample of non-clinical 
undergraduate participants completed the potential items which would form the 
Beliefs About Memory Inventory (BAMI; see Appendix A). The measure 
included items pertaining to beliefs about memory ability, and also questions 
regarding other potentially relevant belief domains, such as beliefs about how 
important memory is to an individual and beliefs about how reliable one’s 
memory is perceived to be.  Participants additionally completed several 
questionnaires concerning both to related and unrelated domains, included to 
allow for examination of the convergent and divergent validity of the measure.  
An exploratory factor analysis was planned to determine the factor structure of the 
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measure.  As part of their pre- assessment for Study 2 (see below), a small sample 
of clinical participants also completed this battery of questionnaires.   
 Study 2 assessed a brief cognitive-behavioural treatment intervention 
focused on beliefs about memory (see Appendix B).  The design was between-
participants, with repeated measures, in which individuals diagnosed with OCD 
who exhibited clinically significant levels of checking were randomly assigned to 
a treatment or waitlist condition.  A waitlist design was deemed appropriate as 
this was a preliminary and exploratory investigation of the utility of the novel 
intervention.  Pre- and post- assessments included measures of beliefs about 
memory, time spent checking, checking symptoms, memory performance and 
processing speed.  (Processing speed was assessed in addition to memory in order 
to have a control measure of a cognitive process that was expected to remain 
stable over time.  As such, I could better evaluate the significance of any changes 
seen in memory performance.) 
 Both studies received ethical approval from the University Human 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendices C and D for ethics certificates 
pertaining to Study 1 and 2, respectively).  Copies of consent forms are also 
appended (see Appendices E and F for Study 1 and 2, respectively).  
Hypotheses  
For Study 1 it was hypothesized that the Beliefs about Memory Inventory 
(BAMI) would have three interrelated but distinct factors (memory confidence, 
importance of memory and reliability of memory).  It was also hypothesized that 
the measure would have sound psychometric properties.  Finally, it was 
hypothesized that the BAMI would predict checking symptoms over and above 
other obsessive-compulsive beliefs.   
For Study 2 it was hypothesized that delivering a brief cognitive-
behavioural intervention focused on beliefs about memory would 1) decrease 
maladaptive beliefs about memory, as well as 2) decrease checking behaviour, 
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and 3) increase memory performance (but not processing speed), for those in the 
treatment condition as compared to the waitlist condition.  It was also 
hypothesized that decreases in maladaptive beliefs about memory would predict 
decreases in symptoms and increases in memory performance.   
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE ASSESSMENT AND IMPACT OF BELIEFS ABOUT MEMORY: 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELIEFS ABOUT MEMORY INVENTORY 
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH COMPULSIVE CHECKING 
Checking is one of the most common symptoms of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & Kessler, 
2010).  OCD is a mental disorder characterized by obsessions (i.e., intrusive 
thoughts, images, or impulses), and/or compulsions (i.e., mental or physical 
rituals designed to reduce distress or anxiety; American Psychiatric Association 
[APA], 2000).  The disorder can substantially impact the quality of life of the 
individual (Eisen et al., 2006) and the lives of their loved ones (Cicek, Cicek, 
Kayhan, Uguz, & Kaya, 2013).  Although effective treatments exist (see 
Chambless et al., 1998), they have remained largely unchanged since their 
development in the late 1960s (Meyer, 1966; see Kozak & Coles, 2005 for a 
review), and leave an alarming number of individuals unwell (e.g., Foa et al., 
2005). 
Over a decade ago, a cognitive model of checking compulsions in OCD 
was proposed (Rachman, 2002).  It included elements of established belief 
domains known to be relevant to OCD, such as inflated responsibility and 
overestimations of threat (see Salkovskis, 1985; Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group [OCCWG], 2005).  It further proposed a self-
perpetuating mechanism which maintains compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002).  
One of the elements of this mechanism was the contention that checking is 
paradoxical in nature, as the more one checks, the less one trusts their memory for 
the check, and thus the doubt and perceived need to continue checking is 
maintained.  Indeed, the relationship between checking and memory confidence 
has received strong empirical support.  Checking does decrease memory certainty 
in student populations using virtual checking tasks (van den Hout & Kindt 
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2003a,b; 2004), real appliances (Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; Coles, 
Radomsky, & Horng, 2006), during mental checks (Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010), and in clinical populations (Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Radomsky, 
Dugas, Alcolado, & Lavoie, 2014).  Thus there is the possibility that low 
confidence in memory, or rather, negative beliefs about one’s memory ability, 
contribute to the aetiology and maintenance of compulsive checking.     
This type of maladaptive belief, however, is not assessed by the Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2005), a measure that was designed to 
capture six belief domains theoretically linked to OCD.  Factor analysis revealed 
they comprised three constructs: 1) responsibility and threat overestimation, 2) 
perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty, and 3) importance of and control 
over thoughts (OCCWG, 2005).  Beliefs about memory were removed from 
consideration at a very early stage of measurement development (OCCWG, 
1997).  Furthermore, existing interventions do not typically target such beliefs 
(Rachman, 2003), although it has recently been proposed that memory confidence 
should be addressed in cognitive therapy for compulsive checking (Radomsky, 
Shafran, Coughtrey & Rachman, 2010).  Thus, the role of beliefs about memory 
in contributing to our understanding and treatment of compulsive checking is 
currently largely unknown, and furthermore not testable using the OBQ. 
There have been some preliminary investigations into the potential role of 
beliefs about memory in compulsive checking.  Low memory confidence has been 
shown to predict checking, even over and above other beliefs related to OCD and 
depressive symptoms (Nedeljkovic, Moulding, Kyrios, &Doron, 2009; 
Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007).  More recently, the interaction between low 
memory confidence and other dysfunctional beliefs was shown to best predict 
checking, above and beyond depression and anxiety (Cuttler, Alcolado, & Taylor, 
2013).  This relationship has also been investigated experimentally.  A paradigm 
was developed to manipulate students’ beliefs about memory (Alcolado & 
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Radomsky, 2011).  Nonclinical individuals were randomly assigned to receive 
one of two types of false feedback regarding their performance on a memory test.  
Those who were led to believe they had a poor memory had significantly more 
urges to check their performance on subsequent tasks compared to those who 
were led to believe they had an excellent memory (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011).  
This result has recently been replicated within the context of prospective memory 
(Cuttler, Sirois-Delisle, Alcolado, Radomsky, & Taylor, 2013).  Taken together, 
this body of work implies that in situ interpretations of memory as being poor 
(low confidence in memory), perhaps more broadly related to, or even caused by 
longstanding maladaptive beliefs about memory, could be an important factor for 
developing and/or maintaining compulsive checking.  Indeed, research has shown 
that obsessive-compulsive checkers have poor memory confidence as compared 
to control participants (Cougle, Salkovskis, & Wahl, 2007).   
One key weakness of previous investigations into beliefs about memory 
has been associated with measurement.  In the experimental studies only 1-item 
prompts were used (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011; Cuttler et al., 2013).  Other 
studies have used items developed for use within their experiments only, and as 
such, have not been independently standardized or validated.  These include the 
Brief Cognitive Confidence Questionnaire, which contains items regarding 
confidence in memory, attention, and perception (Hermans et al., 2008), and the 
Memory for Actions and Events Questionnaire which ascertains how confident 
one is for actions and memories related to ones they performed or watched others 
performed (Cougle et al., 2007).   
To date, certain aspects of beliefs about memory can be assessed by using 
established subscales of validated measures of meta-cognition.  The Memory and 
Cognitive Confidence Scale (MACCS; Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007) also assesses 
confidence in decision-making and attention, and high standards for performance.  
Its general memory subscale contains items that assesses confidence in general 
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memory abilities, such as “I am never certain about my memory”,  The 
Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) includes 
a similar subscale that they authors call ‘cognitive confidence’, although these 
items are actually more specifically related to memory, e.g., “I do not trust my 
memory”, and the items relate to memory ability and trust across different types 
of situations (e.g., memory for places, names, and actions).  Its other subscales 
assess constructs including positive beliefs about worry, cognitive self-
consciousness, negative beliefs about uncontrollability of thoughts and danger, 
and beliefs about need to control thoughts.  Thus, both measures take a focus on 
doubt and trust with respect to specific instances of memory for situations and 
facts, and have few items related to more general trait-like beliefs about memory.  
Both scales also assess domains beyond memory, such as confidence in decision-
making, and attention, and beliefs regarding perfectionism, worry, and 
uncontrollability of thoughts, rather than assessing additional domains within 
memory.  This is useful in terms of breadth, but a more focused measure 
specifically assessing maladaptive beliefs about memory could have other 
advantages. 
A measure that broadly assesses beliefs about memory rather than meta-
memory (i.e., confidence in memory) would be more theoretically useful for the 
elaboration of cognitive models in understanding thoughts and beliefs that 
compulsive checkers hold and for the development of treatment strategies and 
protocols.  The existing measures take a meta-cognitive approach to 
understanding doubt and low confidence in memory.  The development of a 
measure of beliefs would be more practically useful for clinical scientists and 
therapists working within a cognitive-behavioural framework, as maladaptive 
thoughts and beliefs are common intervention targets.  ‘Meta-cognition’ is not 
only an extremely broad concept, but it has also been the subject of an entire set 
of treatment approaches and packages (see Wells, 2009).   
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Thus, given the apparent association between beliefs about memory and 
checking, and the lack of existing measurement tools to specifically investigate 
this relationship, I developed a scale to assess beliefs about memory.  The items 
developed for potential inclusion in the Beliefs About Memory Inventory (BAMI) 
included those associated with memory ability, but also other potentially relevant 
belief domains.  In particular, items to assess beliefs about the importance of 
memory were included, as perceptions of poor memory ability might not 
particularly matter if one does not view a good memory as important or 
personally significant (see Rachman, 1997, on personal significance in OCD).  In 
a similar vein, items to assess beliefs about how reliable memory is perceived to 
be were also developed, as if one views memory as being predominantly fallible, 
this could also decrease the relevance of perceived poor memory ability for 
checking.  These items were administered to a large sample of undergraduate 
students as well as a smaller sample of participants diagnosed with OCD.  
 Study hypotheses were threefold. It was first hypothesis was that the 
BAMI would have three factors (memory confidence, importance of memory and 
reliability of memory).  Secondly, to demonstrate the validity of the measure, it 
was predicted that the BAMI would be highly related to other measures of 
memory confidence and much less related to measures of depression or social 
anxiety.  The third hypothesis was that the resulting version of the BAMI would 
significantly predict checking symptoms, even after accounting for the 
contribution of other already-known obsessive-compulsive beliefs. 
Method 
Participants 
Seven hundred and sixty undergraduate psychology students participated 
and were compensated with course credit.  Sixty-three cases were eliminated 
through the data cleaning process (22 for failing an instructional manipulation 
check and 41 for being multivariate outliers, see Results section).  Thus, the final 
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student sample was comprised of 697 participants (83.4% female), with a mean 
age of 22.67 (SD = 5.32).  Inclusion criteria were the ability to read, write, and 
understand English.   
Twenty-four additional participants with a diagnosis of OCD who reported 
primary checking compulsions also completed the questionnaires, as part of an 
intake battery during their participation in a brief intervention study (see Chapter 
4).  An additional inclusion criterion for this sample was a diagnosis of OCD with 
the presence of significant checking compulsions, as evidenced by at least one 
hour of checking/doubting per day.  Exclusionary criteria were a diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder, psychosis, or current substance dependence.  The majority of 
individuals had a primary diagnosis of OCD (66.67%), followed by Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (16.67%), Social Anxiety Disorder (12.50%), and Major 
Depressive Disorder (4.17%).  The mean number of comorbid diagnoses was 3.25 
(SD = 1.65), although a small portion of the sample met criteria for OCD only 
(16.67%).  The mean clinical severity rating for OCD as measured by the Yale-
Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (see Measures) was 22.42 (SD = 3.48). 
For demographic information on both samples, see Table 1.  Due to a data 
collection error, some demographic information is only available for a portion (n 
= 204) of the student sample.  (Demographic questions were accidentally left out 
in the process of creating the original online questionnaire survey package.  Once 
this error was noticed, they were added to the battery.)  The two samples differed 
in terms of age, with the clinical sample being significantly older, t(23.25) = -
3.83, p = .001, d = -1.027, but did not differ with respect to proportion of female 
to male participants, χ2(1) = 2.57, p = .109.  Regarding education, there were 
significant differences χ2(1) = 38.49, p < .001 between the groups.  To ascertain 
the nature of these differences, follow-up examination of the standardized 
residuals was conducted.  A conservative α level was applied (p < .001) in both 
cases for determining significance of the standardized residuals as is appropriate   
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Table 1 
Participant Characteristics by Group 
  Group 
  Student Clinical 
Age  M = 22.67  
(SD = 5.32) 
M = 33.08  
(SD = 13.30) 
Sex Female 83.4%  70.8% 
BAI*   M = 9.96 
(SD = 8.65)  
M = 15.92 
(SD = 12.57) 
BDI-II**  M = 10.42  
 (SD = 9.58)  
M = 15.42 
(SD = 12.89) 
VOCI***  M = 33.07 
(SD = 27.41) 
M = 85.33 
(SD = 39.42) 
Ethnicity Caucasian 69.1%  75%  
 Other 9.3%  4.2%  
 Filipino 8.8%  0%  
 Japanese 4.4%  0%  
 Black 4.4%  0%  
 Chinese 2.9%  0%  
 South Asian 1.0%  8.3%  
 Latin-American 0%  8.3%  
Language English 67.6%  70.8%  
 French 10.3%  12.5%  
 Spanish 4.4%  8.3%  
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 Arabic 2.9%  0%  
 Chinese 2.0%  0 %  
 Polish 0.5%  0%  
 German 0.5%  0%  
 Italian 0.5%  0%  
 Portuguese 1.0%  4.2%  
Education Some high school 0.0%  4.2%  
 High school diploma 6.9%  4.2%  
 Some college 1.5%  8.3%  
 College diploma 0.0%  4.2%  
 Some university 53.4%  41.7%  
 University degree 10.3%  16.7%  
 Some graduate 0.5%  4.2%  
 Graduate Degree*** 1.5%  16.7%  
Income $0 - $24,999 85.2% 66.7% 
 $25,000 - $49,999 8.9% 25% 
 > $50,000 6% 8.4% 
Note. BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et al., 1990) total score; BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory II (Beck et al., 1996) total score; VOCI = Vancouver 
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (Thordarson et al., 2004) total score.  A 
series of independent samples t-tests confirmed that student and clinical groups 
differed with respect to anxious, depressive, and OCD symptomatology: * p < 
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0.05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Chi-squared tests conducted on categorical data 
revealed differences only on graduate-level education, *** p < 001.  
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for a large sample size (Field, 2009).  Results revealed that there was a greater 
frequency of individuals in the clinical group with graduate level education than 
in the non-clinical group, (z = 3.8, p < .001), but no differences with the expected 
frequency of individuals who had other levels of education (all ps > .001).  There 
were no group differences on income, language or ethnicity (all zs < 3.29, ps > 
.001).  
Measures 
The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, 
DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994) is a semi-structured interview that assesses presence 
and severity of current Axis I disorder episodes in accordance with diagnostic 
criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4
th
 edition 
(APA, 2000).  The ADIS-IV is characterized by good to excellent inter-rater 
reliability across disorders, and very good inter-rater reliability for OCD in 
particular, κ = .85 (Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001).  The ADIS-IV 
was administered by trained graduate-level assessors to clinical participants to 
confirm their diagnosis of OCD, and to also ascertain existence of co-morbid 
diagnoses.  A similarly trained independent rater evaluated twenty percent of the 
interviews at random and the inter-rater agreement on the presence and severity of 
the OCD diagnoses was 100%.  
The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 
1989a) is a 10-item clinician-rated scale that assesses the nature and severity of 
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology along a scale of 0 (‘no symptoms’) to 4 
(‘extreme symptoms’).  Internal consistency of the scale is good (α = .89), as is 
inter-rater reliability (r = .89; Goodman et al., 19889a).  It has good convergent 
validity as it significantly correlates with another measure of OCD (r = .79), and 
good discriminant validity, as it does not significantly correlate with a measure of 
depression (r = .26; Goodman et al., 1989b).  It was administered pre-treatment to 
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the clinical participants only in order to determine the nature and severity of the 
OCD, including the nature of their checking compulsions. 
The potential items for the Beliefs about Memory Inventory (BAMI; 
Alcolado & Radomsky, 2012) were administered (see Appendix A).  These forty 
items were thought to assess individuals’ beliefs about their memory along three 
constructs: 1) beliefs about their memory abilities (MA); 2) beliefs about the 
importance of memory (MI), and 3) beliefs about the reliability of memory (MR).  
They were generated through theory, literature reviews, and consultation with 
colleagues.  They were answered using a 6-point scale from ‘disagree very much’ 
to ‘agree very much’, similar in style to that used in the Obsessional Beliefs 
Questionnaire (OBQ, OCCWG, 2005; see below) with similar instructions, as it 
was also intended to measure beliefs relevant to OCD.  Its properties are reported 
in the main analyses of the results section.   
The Memory and Cognitive Confidence Scale (MACCS; Nedeljkovic & 
Kyrios, 2007) is a 28-item self-report questionnaire that assesses four domains of 
trait meta-memory, including confidence in general memory, decision-making, 
attention/concentration, and high standards for memory confidence, along a 5-
point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.  A confirmatory factor 
analysis has verified the 4-factor structure.  Its item loadings range from .45 to 
.81on their respective factors.  It has good to excellent reliability, and the overall 
internal consistency is .92, with α levels for the scales ranging from .79 to .93 
(Nedeljkovic et al., 2009).  Its subscale assessing confidence in one’s general 
memory ability (MACCS-GC) was used to determine the validity of the BAMI at 
assessing this construct.  The internal consistency of the measure in both the 
student and clinical groups was excellent (α = .93 and .95, respectively).  
The short-form of the Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Wells & 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) is a 30-item questionnaire that assesses five domains of 
meta-cognitive beliefs, including cognitive confidence, positive beliefs about 
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worry, cognitive self-consciousness, negative beliefs about uncontrollability of 
thoughts and danger, and beliefs about the need to control thoughts, along a 4-
point scale from ‘do not agree’ to ‘agree very much’.  It has good to excellent 
internal consistency, with α levels ranging from .72 to .93 and its retest reliability 
is r = .75 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  Its subscale assessing cognitive 
confidence (MCQ-CC) was used to determine the convergent validity of the 
BAMI at assessing a similar construct.  Its internal consistency in the current 
sample was excellent (α = .91 in the student group and .90 in the clinical group).  
The Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski, & 
Schaie, 1990) is a 64-item self-report questionnaire that assesses an individual’s 
perception of their memory functioning.  Exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis revealed four factors: 1) general frequency of forgetting, 2) seriousness 
of forgetting, 3) retrospective functioning, and 4) mnemonics usage.  It has good 
to excellent internal consistency across the four factors with α levels ranging from 
.83-.94 (Gilewski et al., 1990).  Unlike the other measures used in the current 
study, higher scores on this measure indicate less pathology, i.e., better memory 
function.  It was used to determine the convergent validity of the BAMI at 
assessing a similar construct.  Its internal consistency in the current student and 
clinical samples was excellent (α = .93 and .98, respectively). 
The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et 
al., 2004) is a 55-item self-report questionnaire that assesses OCD symptoms 
(including obsessional thoughts, overt behaviours, and personality characteristics) 
along a 5-point scale from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’.  A factor analysis revealed 
six factors including contamination, checking, obsessions, hoarding, ‘just right’, 
and indecisiveness.  It has good internally consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha 
levels ranging from .85 to .96 in a clinical sample for the total scale and subscales 
(Thordarson et al., 2004).  Its retest reliability is excellent, as is its convergent and 
discriminant validity (Radomsky, Ouimet, et al., 2006).  In a student sample, its 
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internal consistency is excellent (α =.96; Thordarson et al., 2004), and its 
convergent validity is good (r =.83; Radomsky, Ouimet, et al., 2006).  It was 
administered to determine how well the BAMI was associated with OCD 
symptoms, especially checking (VOCI-check).  Its internal consistency in the 
current student and clinical groups was excellent (α = .96 for both samples). 
The Obssessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2005) is a 44-
item self-report questionnaire that assesses belief domains thought to be 
associated with OCD symptomatology along a 7-point scale from ‘disagree very 
much’ to ‘agree very much’.  Factor analysis revealed three factors: responsibility 
and threat overestimation (OBQ-RT), perfectionism and intolerance for 
uncertainty (OBQ-PC), and importance of and control over thoughts (OBQ-IC). 
Internal consistency is good with α levels ranging from .89 to .93 across the 
subscales.  Criterion, convergent, and discriminant validity are also good 
(OCCWG, 2005).  It was administered to determine how strongly it was 
associated with the BAMI, as well to determine its ability to predict checking 
symptoms, as compared to the BAMI.  Its internal consistency in the current 
sample was excellent (α = .95 for the student group and α = .94 for the clinical 
group). 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) is a 21-item self-
report questionnaire that assesses anxiety along a 4-point scale from ‘not at all’ to 
‘severely - I could barely stand it’.  Internal consistency is excellent with α = 0.92 
with a clinical (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) and α = .90 with a non-
clinical sample (Osman, Kooper, Barrios, Osman, & Wade, 1997).  Its retest 
reliability is good (r = .75) and it exhibits convergent validity in both a clinical 
and a non-clinical sample (Beck et al., 1988; Osman et al., 1997).  It was 
administered to determine whether the student sample was non-clinical in nature, 
and to establish whether the BAMI was associated with a measure of general 
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anxiety.  Its internal consistency in the current student and clinical samples was 
excellent (α = .90, and α = .95, respectively). 
The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1996) 
is a 21-item self-report questionnaire that assesses depression and suicidality.  
Internal consistency is excellent with an α of .91, and it has high convergent 
validity (Dozois, Dobson, &Ahnberg, 1998).  It was administered to determine 
whether the student sample was non-clinical in nature, and to establish whether 
the BAMI would be associated with OCD symptoms more strongly than with the 
BDI-II, in order to help assess the BAMI’s divergent validity.  Its internal 
consistency in the current student and clinical samples was excellent (α = .93, and 
.95, respectively). 
The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) is a 17-item self-
report questionnaire that assesses social anxiety along a 5-point scale from ‘not at 
all’ to ‘extremely’.  Factor analysis revealed it is comprised of five factors, 
including fear and avoidance of speaking to strangers or at social gatherings, 
criticism and embarrassment, physiological changes, speaking to people in 
authority, and avoidance of being the centre of attention, such as with public 
speaking. Its internal consistency (α ranged from .87 to .94 across subscales), 
convergent validity and divergent validity, and retest reliability (r = .89) are good 
(Connor et al., 2000), and its psychometric properties in non-clinical student 
populations are sound as well (Radomsky, Ashbaugh, et al., 2006).  It was 
administered to aid in assessing the divergent validity of the BAMI, i.e., whether 
the BAMI was associated more with OCD symptoms as compared to social 
anxiety symptoms.  Any number of measures assessing another form of anxiety 
would have sufficed, but the SPIN was chosen in the current study for its brevity.  
Its internal consistency in the current study was excellent (α = .93 for both 
groups). 
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The Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009) is a validated tool for determining whether participants are 
following instructions or responding at random, particularly crucial given this 
study’s sole reliance on questionnaire data.  It includes a lengthy instruction 
section, which begins by addressing the topic of hobbies, but ends by explaining 
the real purpose of the measure.  Below the instructions is a checklist of potential 
hobbies.  Participants who do not read the instructions in their entirety will select 
one or more hobbies as their response.  Those who do read will follow the 
instructions by selecting “Other” as a hobby and writing “I have read the 
instructions” in the response field for that item (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).   
Procedures 
Student participants who enrolled in the study via the psychology 
department’s participant pool were sent a link to the online survey via email.  The 
survey was created using professional online survey software and was comprised 
of the BAMI, MACCS, MCQ, MFQ, VOCI, OBQ, BAI, BDI-II, SPIN, and the 
IMC.  A subset of these participants were invited to complete the retest via an 
email notification sent six weeks after their initial participation, which included a 
link to the potential BAMI items only. 
Clinical participants completed the questionnaires during the first visit of 
their participation in a treatment study (Study 2, see Chapter 4), before any 
intervention occurred.  The ADIS-IV and Y-BOCS were administered by a 
graduate-level experimenter to confirm a diagnosis of OCD and clinically 
significant levels of compulsive checking.  Subsequently, they completed the 
same online questionnaires as the student participants, on a laboratory computer.   
Two sets of questionnaire packages were created to control for potential 
order effects and participants were assigned ID numbers in ascending numerical 
order as they enrolled in the study.  In both packages, the IMC was presented first, 
but the order of the other questionnaires was randomized.  Participants who were 
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assigned odd numbers completed the ‘Order A’ version, and participants who 
were assigned even numbers completed the ‘Order B’ package.  Independent 
samples t-tests using questionnaire order as the independent variable and outcome 
variables of interest (such as depression, anxiety, and OCD symptoms) as the 
dependent variables revealed no significant differences between the Order A and 
Order B packages (all ps > .05).  The two questionnaire orders were thus merged 
for analyses.   
Statistical Plan 
An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted to determine a 
preliminary factor structure and to assess which items to retain for the BAMI.  
This method was chosen as I was interested in understanding the shared variance 
due to the underlying latent variables or constructs of different types of beliefs 
about memory, rather than using a data reduction method such as Principal 
Components Analysis to try and understand all of the variance (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005).  EFA is an appropriate first step to questionnaire development 
(Hinkin, 1998) and it is a widely used and well-understood test that fits with the 
theoretical model of factor analysis (Tabachnik & Fidel, 2007).  It is suitable for 
use when the underlying factor structure is unknown and one’s goal is to 
generalize the conclusions to a larger sample (Field, 2009) and when one wishes 
to identify underlying processes that could produce correlations (Tabachnik & 
Fidel, 2007).  Recommended sample sizes for EFAs range from four to ten 
responses per item (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006; Hinkin, 1998) depending on 
the resulting communalities and factor loadings.  As such, a conservative 
approach was taken for this study, and with our 689 participants I well surpassed 
the minimum goal of obtaining 400 cases (10 cases per each of the 40 items). 
Cronbach’s alpha values were computed to determine the internal 
consistence of the measure.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated on 
the data from participants who completed the BAMI twice in order to determine 
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the re-test reliability.  Correlational analyses were also conducted to examine 
validity.  To examine convergent validity, correlations between the BAMI and 
memory confidence (MACCS-GC and MCQ-CC) as well as memory ability 
(MFQ) were conducted.  Correlations between the BAMI and depression (BDI-II) 
and social anxiety (SPIN) were conducted to determine its divergent validity. 
To examine the clinical participant data, correlational analyses were also 
conducted.  Correlations within the clinical data and the student data were 
examined to determine if the relationships that emerged as significant between the 
items and the factors in the student sample, were also present in the clinical 
sample. 
Finally, to test the hypotheses regarding the predictive power of the 
BAMI, regression methods were used.  A hierarchical regression was conducted 
to determine how well the BAMI predicted OCD checking symptoms (VOCI-
check) over and above known relevant obsessive-compulsive belief domains 
(using the OBQ subscales). 
Results 
Detecting random responders 
Twenty-two student participants were removed because they failed to 
respond correctly to the ICM (Oppenheimer et al., 2009), indicating that they may 
have been ignoring instructions and answering questions at random.  Indeed, a 
series of independent samples t-tests confirmed that their mean scores on many 
measures, including those assessing depression, anxiety, and OCD symptoms 
were significantly different than the mean scores of other participants (ps < .05).   
Data preparation and cleaning  
The student sample data was prepared in accordance with guidelines for 
factor analysis (see Field, 2009).  There was no missing data in either sample as 
we used an online survey software package which alerted participants to 
unanswered items. 
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I first examined the student group dataset for outliers for both the 
individual BAMI items and the total BAMI score.  Multivariate outliers for the 
BAMI items were examined using Mahalanobis distance.  Forty-one cases 
exceeded the test of chi-square significance (p < .001) and these participants were 
therefore removed.  Univariate outliers for the BAMI total were examined by 
converting these scores to z-scores.  None were identified as being more than +/– 
3.29 SD from the mean, thus no additional cases were removed. 
Univariate normality of the individual BAMI items was also examined.  
Nineteen items had significant positive skew and thirteen items had significant 
negative skew (z-scores +/- 3.29, p < .001), comprising 80% of the items.  
Significant kurtosis was also common, evident in 52.5% of the items (10 positive, 
7 negative, z-scores +/- 3.29, p < .001).  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K.-S.) test 
indicated significant non-normality for all items (all ps < .001).  Further, visual 
examination of histograms and Q-Q plots supported the tests in suggesting that 
most items deviated from normality.  It should be noted that these statistical 
techniques often indicate non-normality in large sample sizes (Field, 2009), and 
as such these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Univariate normality of the BAMI total score was also assessed.  Visual 
inspection of a histogram of frequency distributions appeared approximately 
normal, although indicated a slight positive skew and a slightly leptokurtic shape.  
To test the significance of the skew and kurtosis, a very conservative α level was 
used (i.e., only p values less than .001 were considered significant), as is 
appropriate for these tests in very large samples (Field, 2009).  The standardized 
skewness score was not significant (z[skew] = 3.27, p > .001).  Likewise, the 
standardized kurtosis score was also not significant (z[kurtosis] = 2.37, p > .001).  
Univariate normality for the total scores was further examined by visual 
inspection of a Q-Q plot, which appeared non-normal.  The K.-S. test was 
significantly non-normal, (D (697) = .04, p < .01), confirming this observation.  
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 Violations of normality were not unexpected, due in part to the large size 
of the sample, as noted above, but also potentially caused by the characteristics of 
sample.  Students would be expected to score lower and have a smaller 
distribution of scores than a clinical sample on a scale designed to measure 
clinically relevant distorted beliefs.  Importantly, as the extraction method chosen 
(see below) does not require normality, I ultimately chose not to transform the 
data, despite some indication of a non-normal distribution on the total and 
individual BAMI items.  
Exploratory factor analysis I 
In order to understand the structure of the BAMI, an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) was conducted.  I selected a Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) 
extraction method because it is not affected by violations of normality (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005), which is particularly important given the above-reported 
violations of normality. 
An initial unrotated EFA was conducted.  Examination of the correlation 
matrix revealed that most items were significantly correlated with most other 
items.  Furthermore, no items were correlated above r = .90, suggesting the 
absence of problematic multicollinearity.  The determinant of the correlation 
matrix suggested otherwise (the value was smaller than the necessary value to 
exceed), however, upon inspection of the correlation matrix, it was not clear 
which item(s) was/were problematic.  As the extraction method chosen, however, 
assumes some degree of association between items, I decided to proceed with the 
analysis.  Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly significant, χ2(780) = 11030.85, 
p < .001, indicating that the items did correlate significantly with each other, 
indicating some degree of association, which is necessary for EFA (Field, 2009).  
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of Sampling Adequacy was ‘great’ 
(KMO = .89; see Field, 2009), suggesting that the sample was adequate to run the 
EFA given the number of items.  Examination of the diagonals of anti-image 
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matrix revealed that more than half of the individual items also had KMO values 
above .5, suggesting the sample was adequate for evaluating the majority of the 
individual items as well. 
Examination of the eigenvalues revealed an initial 5-factor solution, using 
Kaiser’s criteria of values greater than 1.  However this method alone is not 
thought to be entirely reliable when the sample size is greater than 200, especially 
when one has more than 30 variables (the BAMI scale consisted of 40 potential 
items and the sample size was well over 600), and when the communalities are 
less than .7 (only 2 of the items exhibited communalities greater than .7).  
Examining the scree plot curve for points of inflection is thus thought to be a 
more reliable method of determining the number of factors (Field, 2009).  Visual 
examination of the scree plot suggested 4 or 5 factors.  Only 5% of the residuals 
(which are the difference between the observed correlations and the correlations 
based on the model) were larger than 0.05, suggesting this initial model was 
adequately fit to the data. 
As both the eigenvalues and scree plot suggested 5 factors, an EFA which 
forced this extraction was conducted first.  An oblique rotation (Direct Oblimin) 
was implemented because the factors were expected to correlate with each other 
(Tabachnik & Fidel, 2007).  The solution as a whole explained 41.4% of the 
variance, although the 5
th
 factor now had an eigenvalue less than 1.  To determine 
factor loadings I examined the pattern matrix rather than the factor correlation 
matrix as this is a more appropriate indicator when using this type of rotation 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005).  Inspection of the pattern matrix revealed that there 
was one hyperplane item which loaded on none of the 5 factors, and one complex 
item.  Complex items throughout were defined as items with loadings greater than 
.32 across two or more factors, a common rule of thumb because this value 
indicates there is more than 10% overlapping variance with each factor  (Costello 
& Osborne, 2005).  The solution was re-run and new emerging problematic items 
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removed.  This process was repeated until all problematic loadings were resolved.  
In total, three additional items were removed as a result of this process.  Two 
were hyperplane items that no longer loaded on any factors, and one was an item 
with an extremely low communality (less than .2).  This generated a five-factor 
solution which explained 43% of the variance. Factor loadings for remaining 
items were all greater than .32.  The resulting factors were fairly interpretable, 
comprised of items which suggested factors assessing 1) memory ability, 2) 
memory importance, 3) memory reliability, 4) memory importance (with respect 
to negative consequences), and 5) memory reliability (reverse scored-items only).  
A second EFA extracting only four factors was also run, as this solution 
had also been suggested by the scree plot.  The initially extracted solution 
explained 38.87% of the variance.  Following the removal of one complex item 
and five hyperplane items that loaded on none of the factors, the four-factor 
solution accounted for 41.68% of the variance in the data.  The resulting factors 
were interpretable, comprised of items which suggested factors assessing 1) 
memory ability (MA), 2) memory importance (MI), 3) memory reliability (MR; 
now including reversed-items as well), and 4) memory importance (with respect 
to negative consequences; MIn). 
As the interpretation of the 4-factor solution was clearer than the 5-factor 
(where revered scored items had loaded separately), these factors were retained 
for further examination.  They exhibited adequate to excellent internal 
consistency (αs = .90, .80, .78, and .73 for MA, MR, MI, and MIn, respectively).  
The nature of the associations between factors, however, was unexpected.  The 
MA factor was significantly correlated with MR and MIn (r = .39, and .34, 
respectively, both ps < .001), but not with the MI factor (r = -.03, p > .1).  MR 
was significantly negatively correlated with both the MI and MIn factors (r = -
.14, and -.10 respectively, all ps < .05).  MI and MIn were correlated with each 
other (r = .27, p < .001).   
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To clarify the nature of these factors, I examined the correlations of each 
subscale with the main variables of interest, including the VOCI, VOCIcheck, 
MCQ-CC, MACCS-GC, OBQ, and BAI.  The MA and MIn factors were 
significantly correlated with all of these measures (all ps < .001).  The MR factor 
lacked a significant relationship with VOCI (r = -.01, p > .1), and the OBQ (r = -
.09, p > .1), although it correlated with the MCQ-CC and the MACCS-GC (both 
ps < .001).  The MI factor correlated significantly with all measures (ps < .001), 
except the MCQ-CC and MACCS-GC (both ps > .1).  See Table 2 for a full list of 
correlations. As the individual factors were not all correlated with each other, 
there was a suggestion that they did not represent a unified scale.  I looked to 
theory and research to determine which factors to retain.  Based on previous 
research, from which I expected that the MA subscale would be the most likely to 
be implicated in checking, I prioritized its associations first.  This suggested that 
MR and MIn would be important factors to retain as well, as they were both 
correlated with MA.  Then I considered the associations of each factor with the 
theoretically related measures.  However, only MIn was also related to 
metacognition, checking, and other OC/anxious constructs.  Thus, it was decided 
to conduct an additional EFA on items solely pertaining to the MA and MIn 
subscales to determine the interpretability of such a solution.  The retained MA 
and MIn items were included, as well as the other originally proposed MA and 
MIn items which had been previously excluded through the factor cleaning 
process.  
Exploratory factor analysis II  
An initial unrotated solution containing the above-mentioned items was 
run.  The majority of correlations between items were significant, and thus items 
were acceptable for conducting factor analysis; furthermore there was no evidence 
of multicollinearity (all rs < .90).  Although once again the value of the 
determinant of the correlation matrix suggested otherwise, it was not clear which   
37 
 
 
Table 2  
Correlations of BAMI Factors and Related Constructs in the 4-factor EFA 
 VOCI VOCI-
check 
MCQ- 
CC 
MACCS- 
GC 
OBQ BAI 
MA .33*** .20*** .69*** .79*** .26*** .23*** 
MR -.01 .01 .28*** .35*** -.09 .02 
MI .22*** .15*** .02 .06 .42*** .15*** 
MIn .43*** .23*** .29*** .33*** .49*** .32*** 
Note. MA = Memory Ability factor of the BAMI; MR = Memory Reliability factor of 
the BAMI; MI = Memory Importance factor of the BAMI; MIn = Memory 
Importance (with respect to negative consequences) factor of the BAMI; VOCI = 
Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (Thordarson et al., 2004); VOCI-
check = checking subscale of the VOCI; MCQ-CC = Cognitive confidence 
subscale of the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 
2004); MACCS-GC = General memory confidence subscale of the Memory and 
Cognitive Confidence Scale (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007); OBQ = Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OCCWG, 2005); BAI = Beck  Anxiety Inventory (Beck & 
Steer, 1990). A Bonferonni correction was applied for the 24 correlations 
examined, as such, only correlations of p < .002 were considered to be 
significant. 
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items might be problematic. The overall KMO was excellent (KMO = .91), 
suggesting the sample was adequate for analysis (Field, 2009).  Examination of 
the diagonals of anti-image matrix revealed that more than half of the individual 
items also had KMO values above .5 suggesting the sample size was adequate for 
most individual items as well (Field, 2009).  Both Kaiser’s criteria and visual 
inspection of the scree plot suggested a 2-factor solution.  This solution accounted 
for 41% of the variance.  
A solution extracting 2 factors was conducted to confirm this structure and 
variance explained.  All factor loadings were above .4, and there were no complex 
items.  The factors were interpretable, factor 1 contained all of the proposed MA 
items, and factor 2 contained all of the proposed MIn items (see Table 3).  Thus, 
this version of the measure was retained. 
BAMI properties 
The internal consistency of the measure as a whole was very good (α = 
.88).  The BAMI-MA subscale’s internal consistency was also excellent (α = .90) 
and the internal consistency of the BAMI-MIn was adequate (α = .74).  The 
measure as a whole, as well as both subscales, correlated significantly with each 
other and with measures of OC symptoms (VOCI), beliefs (OBQ), and anxiety 
(BAI; all ps < .001, see Table 4).  Convergent validity was assessed by close 
examination of the correlations between the BAMI and measures of 
cognitive/memory confidence, including the MCQ, MACCS, and MFQ.  Results 
revealed that the full measure and relevant subscales were all significantly 
correlated with these measures (see Table 5).  Thus the measure demonstrated 
strong evidence of convergent validity.   
Divergent validity was assessed by close examination of the association of 
the BAMI with the BDI-II and the SPIN (see Table 5).  Results revealed that the 
BAMI was significantly correlated with these measures as well.  In order to 
determine which associations were stronger, a series of dependent samples t-tests  
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Table 3  
Final BAMI Factor Structure and Loadings 
 Factor 
BAMI Item MA MIn 
I have a poor memory .79 -.04 
I have a good memory .76 -.10 
I can’t rely on my memory .72 .03 
Even when I try to remember something I have seen I find I can’t 
remember it well 
.69 .04 
I have trouble remembering important actions .67 .17 
No matter how much I try I can’t remember to do things that I need to do .63 .16 
No matter how much I try I always seem to forget what I’ve done .61 .26 
When I try to remember what I have done I find I have forgotten it/been 
incorrect 
.60 .21 
When I try to remember something I have seen I always remember it well .59 -.22 
My memory can be trusted most of the time .58 -.08 
I am good at remembering important events .56 -.01 
Often my memory turns out to have been incorrect .56 .06 
My memory always plays tricks on me .49 .13 
When I try I can remember exactly what I’ve seen .46 -.22 
I find that I usually can’t remember what I’ve just done, even when it’s 
really important 
.46 .24 
When I can’t remember something, it means I’m a bad person .11 .66 
A poor memory means I am a bad person .09 .66 
When I can’t remember something, it means I am stupid .17 .59 
A poor memory means I am at risk of becoming an irresponsible person -.01 .58 
A poor memory means I’m dangerous -.09 .49 
Note. BAMI = Beliefs About Memory Inventory; MA = Memory ability factor; MIn = 
Importance of memory (with respect to negative consequences) factor. Bold type 
face indicates the item loads > .40 on the given factor.  
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Table 4  
Correlations between the Final BAMI, Subscales, and OC-related Measures 
 BAMI- 
MA 
BAMI- 
MIn 
VOCI VOCI- 
check 
OBQ BAI 
Student Sample       
BAMI .96*** .54*** .33*** .39*** .61*** .28*** 
BAMI-MA - .28*** .30*** .18*** .21*** .21*** 
BAMI-MIn  - .46*** .24*** .39*** .32*** 
Clinical Sample       
BAMI .98*** .67*** .46* .35† .55** .58** 
BAMI-MA - .51* .44* .36† .47* .56** 
BAMI-MIn  - .34 .20 .66*** .41* 
Note. BAMI = Beliefs About Memory Inventory; BAMI-MA = Memory Ability factor 
of the BAMI; BAMI-MIn = Memory Importance (with respect to negative 
consequences) factor of the BAMI; VOCI = Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive 
Inventory (Thordarson et al., 2004); VOCI-check = checking subscale of the 
VOCI; OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OCCWG, 2005); BAI = Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1990). † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < 
.001.   
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Table 5  
Correlations between BAMI, Subscales, and Measures of Convergent and 
Divergent Validity in the Student and Clinical Samples 
 MFQ MCQ MCQ 
-CC 
MACCS MACCS 
-GC 
BDI-II SPIN 
Student         
BAMI -.57*** .40*** .68* .72*** .77*** .35** .34** 
BAMI-MA -.55*** .33*** .70* .70*** .78*** .29** .29** 
BAMI-MIn -.28*** .39*** .26*** .37*** .30*** .33** .31** 
Clinical        
BAMI -.19 .51* .79*** .77*** .85*** .44* .42* 
BAMI-MA -.26 .47* .80*** .75*** .86*** .43* .36† 
BAMI-MIn .13 .46* .43* .55** .48* .34 .47* 
Note. Negative correlations are expected with the MFQ as higher scores on this 
measure indicate less pathology, in contrast to all other measures.  BAMI = 
Beliefs about Memory Inventory; BAMI-MA = Memory Ability factor of the BAMI; 
BAMI-MIn = Memory Importance (with respect to negative consequences) factor 
of the BAMI; MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire (Gilewski, Zelinski, & 
Schaie, 1990); MCQ & MCQ-30 = Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire and Cognitive 
Confidence subscale of the MCQ (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004); MACCS & 
MACCS-GC = Memory and Cognitive Confidence Scale and General memory 
confidence subscale of the MACCS (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007); BDI-II = Beck 
Depression Inventory II (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1996); SPIN = Social Phobia 
Inventory (Connor et al., 2000). † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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for comparing correlations (Field, 2009) was conducted.  These revealed that the 
BAMI was significantly more strongly associated with the MACCS than with the 
SPIN (t(694) = 7.59, p < .001, r = .08), and also more strongly associated with the 
MACCS than with the BDI-II (t(694) = 7.00, p < .001, r = .08).  Furthermore, the 
BAMI was significantly more strongly associated with the MCQ than with the 
SPIN (t(694) = -4.60, p < .001, r = .03), but not more strongly associated with the 
MCQ than with the BDI-II (t(694) = -1.63, p > .05, r = .003).  Finally, the BAMI 
was significantly more strongly associated with the MFQ than with the SPIN 
(t(694) = -6.00, p < .001, r = .05), and also more strongly associated with the 
MFQ than with BDI-II (t(694) = -7.92, p < .001, r = .08).  Thus, there was good 
evidence of divergent validity for the BAMI.  
Retest reliability data was received from a proportion of the student 
sample (n = 48) using a 6-week retest window.  This longer interval was chosen 
to determine whether the BAMI would be suitable for use in Study 2 as an 
outcome measure (see Chapter 4), where the interval between initial assessment 
and final data collection point for the waitlist condition would be six weeks in 
length. The retest reliability of the full scale was adequate (r = .62).  The retest 
reliability of both the BAMI-MA subscale and the BAMI-MIn subscale were also 
in the adequate range (rs =.65, and .64, respectively). 
Characteristics of the clinical sample 
As can be seen in Table 4, in the clinical sample, the BAMI scale and 
subscales were significantly and highly correlated with each other, as was the case 
for the non-clinical sample.  The internal consistency of the scale’s items were 
also good to excellent in the clinical sample, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .95 for 
the total scale, .96 for BAMI-MA, and .84 for BAMI-MIn.  With respect to 
convergent validity, most correlations between the BAMI scales and measures of 
OCD were either significant or exhibited trend-level associations, with the 
exception of some of the associations with the BAMI-MIn (see Table 4).  This 
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was not unexpected, given the small number of items in this subscale and the 
small sample size, and as such the analyses were likely underpowered.  Further, 
the subscales and full BAMI were significantly and highly correlated with all 
other measures of convergent validity, with the exception of the MFQ (see Table 
5).   
With respect to divergent validity, the BAMI was significantly correlated 
with the BDI and the SPIN, the BAMI-MA was significantly correlated with the 
BDI-II and marginally correlated with the SPIN, and the BAMI-MIn was not 
significantly associated with the BDI-II but was significantly associated with the 
SPIN (see Table 5).  All dependent sample t-tests found no differences between 
the degree of association between the full scale BAMI and measures of 
convergent vs. divergent validity, all ps > .05. 
Predictive power of the BAMI  
To determine whether beliefs about memory contributed to checking 
behaviour, a multiple hierarchical regression was run with VOCI-check as the 
dependent variable.  The three subscales of the OBQ, OBQ-RT,-PC, and -IC, 
were entered in Step 1, and the BAMI subscales of BAMI-MA and BAMI-MIn 
were entered in Step 2.  The final model accounted for 19% of the variance, and 
was a significant predictor of VOCI-check, F(5,691) = 31.59, p < .001.  BAMI-
MA contributed significant additional variance, t(696) = 2.25, p = .02, but BAMI-
MIn did not, t(696) = 0.80, p = .42 (see Table 6). 
Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to develop a self-report measure of 
maladaptive beliefs about memory, as there is reason to believe there is a role for 
such beliefs in compulsive checking.  Results were partially consistent with 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that the BAMI would have three factors, 1) 
beliefs about memory ability, 2) reliability of memory, and 3) importance of 
memory.  Exploratory factor analyses revealed that the BAMI had four factors.   
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Table 6 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Predicting VOCI-check from the OBQ and BAMI 
Subscales 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
OBQ-RT .09 .01 .34*** .09 .01 .32*** 
OBQ-PC .01 .01 .03 .01 .01 .03 
OBQ-IC .03 .02 .09† .02 .02 .06 
BAMI-MA    .03 .02 .08* 
BAMI-MIn    .04 .05 .03 
R2  .18   .19  
F for R2 change  50.08***   3.35*  
Note.  VOCI-check = checking subscale of the Vancouver Obsessional 
Compulsive Inventory (Thordarson et al., 2004); BAMI = Beliefs about Memory 
Inventory; BAMI-MA = Memory Ability factor of the BAMI; BAMI-MIn = Memory 
Importance (with respect to negative consequences) factor of the BAMI; OBQ = 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OCCWG, 2005); OBQ-RT = 
Responsibility/Threat subscale of the OBQ; OBQ-PC = Perfectionism/Certainty 
subscale of the OBQ; OBQ-IC = Importance/Control of thoughts subscale of the 
OBQ. † p < .10; * p < .05; *** p < .001. 
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This was because one of the factors, importance of memory, was split into two 
factors, one containing items pertaining to the negative consequences of a bad 
memory (e.g., “A poor memory means I’m dangerous”), and to do with 
importance with less dire consequences (e.g., “Having a good memory is the key 
to success”).  Finally, however, only two factors were retained, as they were the 
only ones found to be both significantly associated with each other, and with 
related obsessive-compulsive constructs.  These were the beliefs about memory 
ability (BAMI- MA) and beliefs about the importance of memory (with negative 
consequences; BAMI-MIn) factors.  
The second hypothesis pertained to the validity of the BAMI.  It was 
hypothesized that the BAMI would be associated with other measures of memory 
confidence and not at all related to less relevant constructs, such as depression and 
social anxiety.  This hypothesis was also partially supported.  The BAMI was 
significant associated with all of the above constructs, however, for the most part 
it was significantly more closely associated with measures pertaining to cognitive 
confidence than with those assessing social anxiety or depression, with the 
exception of the MCQ measure of memory confidence.  The BAMI was found to 
be equally associated with the MCQ as with social anxiety.  The MCQ is a much 
broader measure, of which only one subscale targets beliefs about memory, and 
which has been found to be associated with other anxiety disorders such as 
generalized anxiety disorder (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  Thus, it is not 
surprising that the BAMI would be as equally associated with it as with the SPIN, 
which assesses another form of anxiety, that related to social concerns.  Overall, 
the convergent and divergent validity of the measure was good, and the retest 
reliability adequate, suggesting that it is a valid and reliable measure of beliefs 
about memory.  Additionally, the measure showed similar relationships to these 
variables in the clinical sample, suggesting its use is appropriate in the OCD 
population for which it is primarily intended.   
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The third and final hypothesis stated that the BAMI would predict OC 
checking symptoms, over and above other OC beliefs.  This hypothesis was also 
partially supported as the BAMI additionally contributed a small but significant 
additional amount of variance.  When examining the contribution of the two 
subscales, BAMI-MA added significant incremental predictive power over and 
above other OC beliefs.  The BAMI-MIn subscale on its own did not emerge as a 
significant predictor.  This finding is reasonable, as the BAMI-MIn is only a 5-
item factor and thus may have limited predictive power.  Furthermore, the small 
amount of additional variance explained is to be expected as beliefs about 
memory are thought to be one additional idiosyncratic belief that may play a role 
in checking for some individuals, and not meant to be the only driving factor that 
predicts checking in all individuals.  Finally, it is possible that the nature of 
memory importance amongst individuals is extremely idiosyncratic, and as such, 
an individual who endorses such items might endorse one, but not all, thus 
reducing the ability of this collection of items to be more powerfully predictive.  
The results of this study are consistent with theory that supports a role for 
beliefs about memory in promoting checking (Rachman, 2002), and with previous 
experimental research that has found that instilling the belief that one has a bad 
memory causes urges to check (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011; Cuttler et al., 
2013).  They also extend the finding that memory confidence can predict 
checking (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007), by demonstrating that broader beliefs 
about memory did as well, although the current study found so in a non-clinical 
sample, whereas the former did so in a sample of individuals diagnosed with 
OCD.  Further, the findings suggest that previous investigations which ultimately 
decided not to include memory-related beliefs in their OC beliefs scale may have 
been premature in doing so (OCCWG, 1997).   
Meta-cognitive research on OCD has found beliefs about confidence in 
memory to be an important domain for understanding and intervening in OCD 
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(see Rees & Anderson, 2013, for a review).  Thus, it is not surprising that in the 
current study a belief domain regarding memory, which could be construed as 
meta-cognition, has a role to play in checking, and perhaps other obsessive-
compulsive-related phenomenology.  Indeed, the production of this measure is 
timely, as newer cognitive-behavioural intervention recommendations for OCD 
include addressing beliefs about memory (Radomsky et al., 2010; Shafran, 
Radomsky, Coughtrey, & Rachman, 2013).  Thus there now exists a measure to 
assess it. 
This study is not without limitations.  This paper reported on the first step 
to developing a novel measure to assess beliefs about memory, and as such used 
an exploratory factor analysis.  These results should be considered tentative until 
and unless they are shown to be replicable via a confirmatory factor analysis.  
Additionally, the use of a non-clinical sample was necessary for data collection 
requirements of the magnitude required to run psychometric analyses, but they do 
potentially limit the generalizability of the findings to a clinical sample.  Although 
correlational analyses demonstrated that the clinical sample’s results were similar 
in some ways to that of the non-clinical sample’s, a larger clinical sample would 
help clarify whether or not there are meaningful differences between the two, and 
whether or not the BAMI can predict checking in a clinical sample as well.  The 
low correlations seen in our small clinical sample between the BAMI subscales 
and VOCI-check may have hampered our ability to adequately address this 
question in the present study.  These correlations may have resulted from the fact 
that all clinical participants reported primary checking symptoms; a more 
heterogeneous sample of participants with a broader range of OCD symptoms 
may help to clarify the nature of the relationship between beliefs about memory 
and checking symptomatology.  Relatedly, although OC symptoms may well lie 
along a continuum in the population (see Mataix-Cols, Rosario-Campos, & 
Leckman, 2005), and although analogue samples are appropriate for studying OC 
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symptoms and beliefs in general (see Abramowitz et al., 2014, for a recent 
review) it has not yet been investigated whether potentially maladaptive beliefs 
about memory related to OCD exhibit the same properties.  
A notable strength of this study was the large sample size, which allowed 
for appropriate testing of the study hypotheses and confidence in the results.  
Similarly, the inclusion of a clinical sample of individuals who not only had 
OCD, but who exhibited clinical levels of compulsive checking, was another 
strong design choice, but may have hampered our power with respect to the 
strength of the correlations due to restricted range. 
There are some notable implications of the current findings.  This was the 
first attempt, to our knowledge, to develop a measure for assessing beliefs about 
memory, which could prove to be valuable both for future research investigating 
this construct, as well as for clinicians seeking to evaluate it and address it within 
a treatment context.  Further, the results demonstrated that beliefs about memory 
are not only associated with checking, but that they have the potential to predict 
checking over and above known relevant belief domains.  These findings imply 
that beliefs about memory are an important construct to be further explored in our 
understanding of the theory, etiology, maintenance, treatment, and prevention of 
compulsive checking.  Finally, these results have shown that not only do beliefs 
about memory ability play a role in checking, but that beliefs about the 
importance of memory do as well. This finding has implications not only with 
respect to the need to adequately assess these constructs, but also suggest they 
may need to be addressed in treatment.  With respect to comparing memory 
ability to memory importance, it may be that memory ability only matters if one 
thinks that memory is important, which suggests the relationship between these 
two should be investigated further, and in clinical samples. 
There are a number of pertinent future directions that follow directly from 
this study’s findings. The next logical step would be to collect further data on this 
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instrument in order to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis that could clarify the 
stability of the current findings.  The measure may also benefit from refinement 
with respect to number of items in each factor, such as expanding the number of 
items relating to beliefs about the importance of memory and/or decreasing the 
number of items relating to beliefs about memory ability, such that the factors are 
given more equal weight in the measure.  With respect to investigations with 
clinical populations, additional information on how the measure works in a larger 
clinical sample, both within compulsive checkers and individuals with other 
forms of OCD, is warranted to clarify the range of utility of the measure.  Firstly, 
such an investigation would also allow exploration of whether or not the BAMI 
has the power to predict checking in a clinical sample as well as a non-clinical 
one.  Secondly, a reasonable question that follows from these findings is whether 
beliefs about memory are only pertinent to compulsive checking or whether they 
play a role in other OC symptoms.  Beyond the context of OCD, it may also be 
that beliefs about memory contribute to symptomatology in other affective 
disorders where repeated information is sought and/or repeated behaviour.  For 
example reassurance seeking is often sought in the context of depression for 
social-related reasons (e.g., concerns about abandonment and loss of social 
support; Parrish & Radomsky, 2010).  The BAMI may be a useful measure for 
answering these and other pertinent empirical questions in which measurement of 
beliefs about memory would be useful.  These could include psychometric 
investigations to further our theoretical understanding of the predictive power of 
these constructs as well as longitudinal survey and treatment studies where the 
BAMI could be used to monitor change over time.  Outside the research realm, 
the utility of such a measure in a treatment setting would be useful to both the 
clinician and the client who wish to potentially effect changes in checking 
symptoms by exploring this relevant target.  
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 Chapter 3: 
BRIDGE 
 Maladaptive beliefs about memory are known to predict checking 
(Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007) and to cause urges to check (Alcolado & 
Radomsky, 2011; Cuttler, Sirois-Delisle, Alcolado, 2013).  Study 1 was designed 
to develop a focused measure of beliefs about memory in order to be able to more 
easily assess these beliefs in future psychometric, experimental, and treatment-
related investigations.  Potential items for the Beliefs About Memory Inventory 
(BAMI) were generated along three purported dimensions: beliefs relevant to 
memory ability, memory reliability, and importance of memory.  Items were 
administered, in conjunction with other relevant measures, to a large sample of 
undergraduates and a small sample of individuals with OCD who had clinically 
significant levels of checking and doubt.  An exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted on the student sample data in order to determine the factor structure 
and items to retain.   
Results indicated that the BAMI was comprised of two factors, 1) beliefs 
about memory ability, and 2) beliefs about the importance of memory (with 
respect to negative consequences).  The measure was shown to have sound 
psychometric properties and to be acceptable for use with a clinical sample.  
Finally, regression analyses demonstrated that the measure was able to predict 
checking symptoms over and above known relevant OCD-relevant belief 
domains.  These findings demonstrate that the BAMI is a useful tool for capturing 
these beliefs, and moreover, provide further evidence that beliefs about memory 
are implicated in compulsive checking.   
Bearing in mind that existing treatments for OCD do not target 
maladaptive beliefs about memory, and that they still have considerable room for 
improvement (e.g., Shafran, Radomsky, Coughtrey, & Rachman, 2013; Whittal, 
Woody, McLean, Rachman, & Robichaud, 2010), it would seem intervening with 
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respect to beliefs about memory has the potential to increase treatment 
effectiveness.  Indeed, including this type of intervention in treatments for 
compulsive checking has been suggested (Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey, & 
Rachman, 2010; Shafran et al., 2013), but not yet tested. 
Theory of compulsive checking also implicates maladaptive beliefs about 
memory in the checking cycle (Rachman, 2002).  Further, there is a wealth of 
evidence as to the detrimental effects of checking on memory confidence (e.g., 
van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a).  Current cognitive interventions for OCD, 
although they include a focus on doubt/checking, do not address maladaptive 
beliefs about memory directly (e.g., Clark, 2003; Rachman, 2003).  Of relevance, 
elsewhere in the literature it has been proposed that maladaptive beliefs about 
memory may better account for the inconsistent findings with respect to memory 
deficits in OCD (Cougle et al., 2007; Muller & Roberts, 2005; Radomsky & 
Alcolado, 2010).   
Study 2, therefore, drawing from theory and recent experimental evidence, 
endeavoured to develop and test an intervention specifically targeting beliefs 
about memory.  I sought to determine whether such an intervention could change 
these beliefs, alleviate checking symptoms, and improve memory performance.  
Participants with clinical levels of checking and doubt were randomly assigned to 
receive a brief 2-session treatment focused on beliefs about memory or to a 
waitlist control group, as a preliminary, exploratory test of this hypothesis.  
Utilizing the newly developed BAMI, beliefs about memory were measurable, 
and thus were assessed via this instrument at pre- and post- assessment, as were 
checking symptoms and memory ability.    
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CHAPTER 4: 
A NOVEL COGNITIVE INTERVENTION FOR COMPULSIVE 
CHECKING: TARGETING MALADAPTIVE BELIEFS ABOUT 
MEMORY 
Checking is one of the most frequently reported compulsions in obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & 
Kessler, 2010), and is associated with profound doubt and uncertainty (Rachman, 
2002).  A major advance in understanding the nature of checking behaviour came 
from a series of experiments by van den Hout and Kindt (2003a,b; 2004).  The 
authors proposed that checking causes less detailed and vivid encoding of one’s 
memory for the check, which in turn causes less confidence when one tries to 
precisely recall what has occurred.  They posited that these decrements in meta-
memory occur because the more one checks, the more familiar the event becomes.  
This probably-universal phenomenon was proposed to be particularly problematic 
in the context of OCD, wherein individuals may have higher standards for 
certainty and likely prefer to rely on an exact, precise recall of events, rather than 
a general sense of knowing, in order to be sure they have checked properly (van 
den Hout & Kindt, 2003b).   
Support for the paradoxical nature of repeated checking, whereby 
checking erodes, rather than increases aspects of meta-memory, was first 
demonstrated using a virtual checking paradigm (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a).  
Non-clinical participants provided ratings of their memory confidence, vividness, 
and detail about virtual stove checking pre and post a series of repeated checking 
trials.  During these repetitions, half of the participants checked virtual stove 
burners 20 times (relevant checking), while half checked virtual light bulbs 20 
times (irrelevant checking).  Only those who engaged in relevant checking 
reported decreases in memory confidence, vividness, and detail, from pre- to post-
repeated checking.  Importantly, participants in the relevant checking condition 
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were just as accurate as individuals completing irrelevant checking at reporting 
which stove burners they had operated.  Those in the relevant checking condition 
also demonstrated a shift from relying on “remembering” to “knowing” (Tulving, 
1985; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003b; 2004).  Declines in meta-memory following 
repeated checking are robust, and have been replicated using real working 
appliances (Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006; Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault, 
2006), during mental checking (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010) and with clinical 
samples (Boschen & Vuksanovik, 2007; Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie, 
2014).   
Declines in aspects of meta-memory following repeated checking are 
consistent with the cognitive theory of compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002).  A 
key component of this theory is a “self-perpetuating mechanism” (p. 629) wherein 
checking is perpetuated in part because although individuals may check to reduce 
initial uncertainty, the act of checking paradoxically increases uncertainty.  This 
increased uncertainty propels the individual to continue to check.   
A potential consequence of the decrements in meta-memory caused by 
checking is that over time, following attempts to retrieve memories that are by 
nature lacking in detail and vividness, individuals may come to believe that they 
possess a poor memory.  Indeed, low confidence in memory has been shown, 
psychometrically, to predict checking over and above known OCD-relevant belief 
domains (Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007).  This body of work led us to question 
whether manipulating beliefs about memory ability could impact checking 
phenomenology (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011).  Undergraduate students 
completed a battery of memory tests and were then randomly assigned to receive 
either positive or negative false feedback about their performance.  Those 
individuals who were told they had a very poor memory had significantly greater 
urges to check their performance on a series of subsequent tasks, as compared to 
those who were told they had an excellent memory.  This finding has now been 
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replicated in the context of prospective memory (Cuttler, Sirois-Delisle, Alcolado, 
Radomsky, & Taylor, 2013).  As such, maladaptive beliefs about memory may be 
a hitherto neglected belief domain pertinent to compulsive checking (Alcolado & 
Radomsky, 2011).  
A number of other belief domains have been proposed to be central to 
OCD.  Building upon Paul Salkovskis’s (1985) earlier work positing inflated 
responsibility as central in maintaining OCD symptoms, the Obsessive-
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG; 1997) set out to determine the 
beliefs most relevant to OCD.  The group ultimately found six belief domains 
within three categories: 1) inflated responsibility/threat overestimation; 2) 
importance of/control over thoughts, and 3) perfectionism/intolerance of 
uncertainty (OCCWG, 2005).  Importantly, beliefs about memory were removed 
from consideration at the first phase of their investigations (OCCWG, 1997), and 
as such, in our view, have not received sufficient attention in the literature on 
maladaptive beliefs in OCD. 
As beliefs about memory may be implicated in checking and memory 
performance, perhaps targeting them in treatment would alleviate checking-
related symptomatology.  van den Hout and Kindt (2004) suggested, based on 
their findings, that treatment for OCD include learning to tolerate decreased meta-
memory.  Beyond increasing tolerance, therapeutic psychoeducation and 
behavioural experiments could perhaps additionally increase positive beliefs 
about memory ability, countering decreased meta-memory.  Indeed, a new 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) protocol for compulsive checking which 
includes these elements has been proposed (Radomsky, Shafran, Coughtrey, & 
Rachman, 2010), although a clinical investigation is still underway.   
Examining the impact of beliefs about memory on checking 
symptomatology also provides an ideal opportunity to assess the degree to which 
such beliefs are related to memory performance.  Compulsive checking has 
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previously been proposed to be associated with a deficit in memory, particularly 
in non-verbal recall (e.g., Tallis, 1997), but this view remains controversial, as 
others have suggested that any deficits observed may be secondary to the 
disorder.  In particular, these deficits are not specific to checkers (Cuttler & Graf, 
2009), and providing threat-relevant information can negate the ‘memory deficit’ 
(Marsh et al., 2009).  Moreover, individuals with OCD have been found to have 
superior memory for stimuli that are personally significant (Constans, Foa, 
Franklin, & Mathews, 1995; Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, Rachman, 
& Hammond, 2001; Tolin et al., 2001), especially under ecologically valid 
conditions (Coles & Heimberg, 2002).  To explain these seemingly opposing 
results, it has been suggested that negative beliefs about one’s memory ability 
may undermine memory performance (Cougle et al., 2007; Radomsky & 
Alcolado, 2010; Radomsky & Rachman, 2004; Radomsky, Rachman, & 
Hammond, 2001).  Indeed, a study by Nedeljkovic (2006) found that after 
controlling for meta-cognitions (including confidence in memory, decision 
making, attention, concentration, and perfectionistic standards for memory) 
impaired neuropsychological performance did not significantly predict OCD 
symptoms in a sample of clinical checkers.   
As the ability of an intervention designed specifically to target beliefs 
about memory to impact checking and memory performance has not yet been 
conducted, this was the primary goal of the current pilot, exploratory study of the 
potential utility of such an intervention.  It was hypothesized that a two-session 
cognitive intervention focused on beliefs about memory would a) decrease 
maladaptive beliefs about memory, b) decrease checking behaviour, and c) 
increase memory performance in individuals receiving treatment, as compared to 
those in a waitlist condition.  In addition to measuring visuospatial recall, 
processing speed was also assessed as a cognitive control task that was expected 
to remain stable across time.  Finally, it was expected that changes in maladaptive 
56 
 
 
beliefs about memory would be predictive of lower checking symptoms, and 
enhanced memory performance. 
Method  
Participants 
Participants (N = 24) were individuals with a diagnosis of OCD who 
reported significant checking and/or doubting symptoms.  Thoughts of 
doubt/uncertainty and behaviours of checking compulsions were required to cause 
significant distress and/or interference and to be evident for at least one hour per 
day.  Exclusion criteria were the presence of current substance dependence, 
bipolar disorder, or psychosis.  Participants were recruited from a registry of 
individuals with OCD interested in research studies, via campus flyers, classroom 
recruitment, and through advertisements placed online.  Participants were 
compensated financially for the assessment visits (see below), but not for the 
treatment.  See Table 7 for demographic information. 
The majority of the sample had a primary diagnosis of OCD (66.67%).  
Other primary diagnoses included Generalized Anxiety Disorder (16.67%), Social 
Anxiety Disorder (12.50%), and Major Depressive Disorder (4.17%).  A minority 
of participants presented solely with OCD (16.67%), and the mean number of co-
morbid diagnoses in the remainder of the sample was 3.25 (SD = 1.65).  There 
were no differences between the treatment and waitlist conditions with respect to 
primary diagnosis, χ2(4) = 3.93, p = .42.  There were also no condition differences 
with respect to mean number of co-morbid diagnoses, t(1,22) = 1.39, p = .18, d = 
.56 (treatment M = 3.58, SD = 1.83, waitlist M = 2.67, SD = 1.37).  See Table 7 
for clinical severity ratings. 
Measures 
Beliefs about Memory Inventory (BAMI; Alcolado & Radomsky, 
2012).  The BAMI self-report questionnaire comprises twenty items that assess 
individuals’ beliefs about their memory.  It contains two subscales, 1) beliefs  
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Table 7.  
Participant Characteristics by Condition 
  Condition 
  Treatment (N  = 12) Waitlist (N = 12) 
Age  M = 35.83, SD = 
14.43 
(20-65) 
M = 30.33, SD = 
12.06 
(21-62) 
Sex  66.7% Female (N = 8) 75% Female (N = 9) 
ADIS-IV  OCD Severity M = 4.67 SD = 0.78 M = 4.75, SD = 0.87 
Y-BOCS  Total M = 22.08, SD = 2.81 M = 22.75, SD = 
4.14 
 Obsessions M = 10.67, SD = 2.06 M = 11.00, SD = 
2.22 
 Compulsions M = 11.42, SD = 1.56 M = 11.75, SD = 
2.38 
Ethnicity    
 Caucasian 83% (N = 10) 66.7% (N = 8) 
 South Asian 0% 16.7% (N = 2) 
 Latin American 8.3% (N = 1) 8.3% (N = 1) 
 Arab/West Asian 0% 8.3% (N = 1) 
 Mixed Race 8.3% (N = 1) 0% 
Language spoken at home 
 English 75% (N = 9) 66.7% (N = 8) 
 French 8.3% (N =1) 16.7% (N = 2) 
 Spanish 8.3% (N =1) 8.3% (N = 1) 
 Portuguese 8.3% (N =1) 0% 
 Persian 0% 8.3% (N = 1) 
Education    
 Some High School 8.3% (N = 1) 0% 
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High School 
Diploma 
0% 8.3% (N = 1) 
 Some College 0% 8.3% (N = 1) 
 College Diploma 8.3% (N = 1) 0% 
 Some University 58.3% (N = 7) 33.3% (N = 4) 
 University Degree 16.7% (N = 2) 16.7% (N = 2) 
 Some Graduate 8.3% (N = 1) 0% 
 Graduate Degree 0% 33.3% (N = 4) 
Income    
 $0 - $24,999 66.67% (N = 8) 66.67% (N = 8) 
 $25,000 - $49,999 25% (N = 3) 25% (N = 3) 
 >$50,000 8.3% (N = 1) 8.3% (N = 1) 
Note. ADIS-IV = Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (Brown et al., 
1994); Y-BOCS = Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders Inventory 
(Goodman et al., 1989a); No differences were found between conditions with 
respect to continuous variables, as calculated by independent samples t-test (all 
ps > .10), or categorical variables, as calculated by chi square tests (all ps > .10).  
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about memory ability (e.g., “No matter how much I try, I always seem to forget 
what I’ve done”), and 2) beliefs about the importance of memory (e.g., “A poor 
memory means I’m dangerous”).  Items are rated along a 6-point scale from 
disagree very much to agree very much.  The measure has very good internal 
consistency (α = .88), good convergent and divergent validity, and adequate retest 
reliability (r = .62).  In the current sample internal consistency was excellent, α = 
.95. Please note that participants actually completed all 40 items from the original 
BAMI (see Chapter 2) but that only those 20 retained as part of Study 1’s 
analyses were extracted to form the BAMI as used herein. 
Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory, checking subscale 
(VOCI-check; Thordarson et al., 2004).  The VOCI is a 55-item self-report 
questionnaire that assesses OCD symptoms along a 5-point scale from not at all 
to very much.  The measure contains six subscales, including checking, 
contamination, obsessions, hoarding, ‘just right’, and indecisiveness.  The VOCI 
has excellent convergent and divergent validity.  The checking subscale, 
comprised of six items, exhibits excellent internally consistency, α = .96, and 
retest reliability, r = .96 (Radomsky, Ouimet, et al., 2006; Thordarson et al., 
2004).  In the current sample, the internal consistency of the checking subscale 
was α = .92.  
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, 
DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994).  The ADIS-IV is a semi-structured interview that 
assesses presence and severity of Axis I disorders.  It exhibits good inter-rater 
reliability, κ = .81 (Brown et al., 1994).  In the current study, an independent rater 
evaluated twenty percent of the interviews at random and there was 100% 
agreement for all OCD diagnoses.  
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 
1989a).  The Y-BOCS is a 10-item clinician-rated scale that assesses the nature 
and severity of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology along a scale of 0 (‘no 
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symptoms’) to 4 (‘extreme symptoms’).  Internal consistency of the scale is good 
(α = .89), as is inter-rater reliability (r = .89; Goodman et al., 1989a).  It has good 
convergent (r = .79 with a measure of OCD) and divergent (r = .26 with a 
measure of depression) validity (Goodman et al., 1989b).   
Daily monitoring forms. These were completed by participants at the end 
of each day.  The monitoring forms were used primarily to track total time spent 
checking in minutes.  Additionally, participants provided ratings of the degree to 
which they believed they had a poor memory using a 0-100 point scale, where 0 
indicated no belief they had a poor memory that day, and 100 indicated absolute 
belief they had a poor memory that day.  To obtain average daily time spent 
checking in minutes and average daily monitoring-beliefs about memory (DM-
BAM) for each time period an ‘average daily rating’ score was calculated.  
Ratings for each day during a given period were summed and divided by the 
number of days each participant was in that period (typically 6 or 7 days).   
Complex Figures (CF).  The Rey Complex Figure Test (RCFT; Meyers 
& Meyers, 1995) assesses visuospatial memory.  The Modified Taylor Complex 
Figure (MTCF; Hubley, 1996) was developed as an alternate form of the RCFT to 
minimize practice effects and was used as such in the current study (see 
Procedure).  Although the Copy and Immediate recall trials were administered as 
per guidelines (Meyers & Meyers, 1995), we were interested specifically in 
immediate recall trial performance.  Retest reliability for the immediate recall of 
the RCFT is good, r = .76.  Convergent validity is good (r = .33), as is construct 
validity, r = .58 (Meyers & Meyers, 1995).  The RCFT and the MTCF figures 
have been shown to be comparable in difficulty (Hubley & Jassal, 2006: Hubley 
& Tremblay, 2002). 
 Trail 1 of the Comprehensive Trail-Making Test (CTMT-1; Reynolds, 
2002).  The CTMT-1 (Reynolds, 2002) is a visual scanning, search, and 
sequencing task, measuring basic processing speed.  Trail 1 exhibits good internal 
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consistency, reliability coefficient = .73, retest reliability, r = .74, and construct 
validity, r = .70 (Reynolds, 2002). 
Procedure 
 All design details, including the screening, assessments, and therapy visits, 
were administered using a standardized protocol to ensure uniformity of 
administration across participants. 
Screening and Baseline.  Participants were screened by phone and if 
eligible, were scheduled for a first assessment visit to take place approximately 
one week later.  They were also sent the monitoring forms, which they were asked 
to complete daily for the duration of the study, regardless of condition 
assignment.  This first week of monitoring was used as a baseline measure of time 
spent checking and beliefs about memory. 
 ‘Pre-’ assessment.  At the pre-treatment/waitlist assessment, participants 
completed the RCFT or the MTCF (in a randomized, counterbalanced manner) 
and the CTMT-1 with an independent graduate-level assessor trained in cognitive 
assessment.  The study therapist (GA) was a doctoral-level graduate student with 
extensive training in cognitive-behavioural therapy.  She administered the ADIS-
IV and the Y-BOCS to participants to confirm eligibility.  Participants finished 
the assessment by completing the VOCI-check and BAMI questionnaires before 
being randomly assigned to the treatment or waitlist condition.  Time spent 
checking and beliefs about memory ratings from the monitoring forms during the 
week immediately following this visit were used for the ‘pre-’ assessment scores. 
 Treatment Visits.  For participants in the treatment condition, the first 
therapy session occurred approximately one week following the pre- assessment. 
The second therapy session occurred approximately one week after the first.  Each 
session was approximately 50 minutes in duration.  Time spent checking and 
beliefs about memory ratings from the monitoring form during the week 
immediately following the second therapy visit were used for the ‘post-’ 
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assessment scores.  During this time, participants in the waitlist condition 
continued to complete the daily monitoring forms but did not attend any type of 
laboratory visit.   
‘Post-’ assessment.  For individuals in the treatment condition, this visit occurred 
approximately one week after the second therapy session.  For individuals in the 
waitlist condition this visit occurred after a similar amount of time had elapsed 
(i.e., approximately three weeks after their pre-waitlist assessment).  At the post-
treatment/waitlist assessment, participants completed the CTMT-1 once more and 
the version of the CF they had not previously completed (either the RCFT or the 
MTCF), administered by an independent assessor who was blind to participant 
condition.  Participants then completed the BAMI and VOCI-check before being 
fully debriefed.  For ethical reasons, those participants in the waitlist condition 
were subsequently offered the study intervention, although data obtained from 
these participants were not included in the current study.  As monitoring is known 
to be therapeutic (e.g., Korotitsch & Nelson-Gray, 1999), the two conditions 
would not be equivalent in nature at treatment commencement.  Therefore, data 
across the two conditions was not collapsed for any analysis. 
Treatment.  The intervention was a manualized cognitive-behavioural 
module developed by the authors for the purpose of the current study, in 
collaboration with their research team, and in consultation with other experts in 
the cognitive-behavioural treatment for OCD.  Agenda elements, 
psychoeducation, discussion prompts, and between-session exercises were 
standardized across all participants.   
In the first session, the therapist taught participants about the self-
perpetuating nature of checking, provided psychoeducation about the research that 
has supported this mechanism and explained the role that beliefs about memory 
may have in checking behaviour.  The participants and the therapist discussed 
participants’ beliefs about their memory ability, the possibility that their memory 
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might be better than they thought, and the need to gather evidence about the true 
state of their memory ability for the objects they check.  For the between-session 
exercise, participants were asked to gather information about their checks four 
times during the week.  Participants recorded their prediction before checking 
(e.g., “I think the light is still on”), and the outcome after checking (e.g., 
“Actually, the light was already off”). 
In the second sessions the results of the between-session exercise were 
reviewed.  The existence of a possible discrepancy between beliefs about memory 
and actual memory ability was presented.  Participants discussed with the 
therapist whether or not they thought they had symptoms of any 
neuropsychological impairment in memory.  Different types of memory were 
defined and examples of memory failures in these areas were described (see 
below).  A second between-session exercise pertaining to beliefs about memory 
was assigned.  Participants were given a light switch and were asked to use it four 
times during the week in order to assess whether they had any of three possible 
types of memory failures (discussed during the session) after using it.  The 
possible types of memory failures discussed during the session were with respect 
to: 1) episodic memory (i.e., ability to remember having used the switch); 2) 
semantic memory (i.e., ability to recall the name of the object); and 3) procedural 
memory (i.e., ability to remember how to manipulate the switch). 
An independent rater coded audio recordings of all intervention visits to 
ensure that the therapist followed the treatment protocol, using the manual to 
divide each treatment session into 44 distinct elements.  The experimenter 
delivered, on average, 92% and 86% of session elements for the first and second 
sessions, respectively. 
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Results 
Effect of intervention on beliefs about memory 
A 2 x 2 repeated measures MANCOVA was conducted, with baseline 
DM-BAM as a covariate, condition (treatment vs. waitlist) as the between 
participants variable, and time (pre- vs. post- assessment) as the within-
participants variable.  The two dependent variables of interest were DM-BAM 
and BAMI scores.  Results showed that the covariate accounted for significant 
variance in the dependent variables, F(1,21) = 30.49, p < .001,   
  = .59.  There 
was no main effect of time, F(1,21) = 1.01, p = .33,   
  = .05, or condition, F(1,21) 
= 0.02, p = .89,   
  = .00, but there was a significant interaction between time and 
condition, F(1,21) = 25.43, p < .001,   
  = .55. 
Follow-up analyses were run for each dependent variable separately.  A 
repeated measures ANCOVA with DM-BAM as the dependent variable and 
baseline DM-BAM as a covariate was conducted.  There was no main effect of 
time, F(1,21) = 0.07, p = .79,   
  = .00 or condition, F(1,21) = 1.86, p = .19,   
  = 
.08.  Unsurprisingly, baseline DM-BAM was significantly related to post- 
assessment DM-BAM, F(1,21) = 54.84, p < .001,   
  = .72.  Consistent with 
hypotheses, there was a significant interaction between time and condition, 
F(1,21) = 22.84, p < .001,   
  = .52.  As predicted, there were decreases in DM-
BAM in the treatment but not the waitlist condition (see Figure 1).   
A repeated measures ANOVA with BAMI scores as the dependent 
variable revealed no main effect of time, F(1,22) = 0.02, p = .90,   
  = .00, or 
condition, F(1,22) = 0.25, p = .62,   
  = .01, but a significant interaction between 
the two, F(1,22) = 10.48, p = .004,   
  = .32.  As predicted, there were decreases 
in BAMI scores in the treatment but not the waitlist condition (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Beliefs about memory pre- and post- assessment, as measured by DM-
BAM (average Daily Monitoring-Beliefs About Memory) and BAMI (Beliefs About 
Memory Inventory [Alcolado & Radomsky, 2012]) scores. Asterisks indicate 
significant interactions between time and condition, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Effect of treatment on checking 
A 2 x 2 repeated measures MANCOVA was conducted, with baseline 
daily monitoring time spent checking as a covariate, condition (treatment vs. 
waitlist) as the between participants variable, and time (pre- vs. post- assessment) 
as the within-participants variable.  The two dependent variables of interest were 
time spent checking as measured by the daily monitoring forms and VOCI-check 
scores.  Baseline time spent checking was entered as a covariate to control for 
initial differences between conditions.  The covariate accounted for significant 
variance in the dependent variables, F(1,21) = 25.17, p < .001,   
  = .54; however, 
after controlling for this variance, there was the expected significant interaction 
between time and condition, F(1,21) = 17.64, p < .001,   
  = .46.  There were no  
main effects of time, F(1,21) = 5.12, p = .12,   
  = .11, or condition, F(1,21) = 
0.37, p = .55,   
  = .02.   
Follow-up analyses were run for each dependent variable separately.  A 
repeated measures ANCOVA with time spent checking as the dependent variable 
and baseline time spent checking as a covariate was conducted.  There was no 
main effect of time, F(1,21) = 2.66, p = .12,   
  = .11, or condition, F(1,21) = 
1.18, p = .29,   
  = .05.  Although baseline time spent checking was significantly 
related to post- assessment time spent checking, F(1,21) = 34.69, p < .001,   
  = 
.62, there was, as expected, a significant interaction between time and condition, 
F(1,21) = 13.72, p = .001,   
  = .40, such that there were decreases from pre- to 
post- assessment in time spent checking for the treatment but not the waitlist 
condition (see Figure 2).   
A repeated measures ANOVA with VOCI-check as the dependent variable 
revealed no main effect of condition, F(1,21) = 1.38, p = .25,   
  = .06.  There was 
a main effect of time, F(1,22) = 2.56, p = .034,   
  = .19, which should be 
interpreted within the context of a significant interaction between time and  
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Figure 2. Checking symptom ratings pre- and post- assessment, as measured by 
average daily time spent checking and VOCI-check (Vancouver Obsessional 
Compulsive Inventory [Thordarson et al., 2004] checking subscale) scores. 
Asterisks indicate significant interactions between time and condition: ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001.  
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condition, F(1,21) = 11.97, p = .002,   
  = .35.  As expected, there were decreases 
from pre- to post- assessment in symptoms for the treatment but not the waitlist 
condition (see Figure 2).   
Effect of treatment on cognitive performance 
A 2 x 2 repeated measures MANOVA was conducted, with condition 
(treatment vs. waitlist) as the between participants variable, and time (pre- vs. 
post- assessment), as the within-participants variable.  The two dependent 
variables of interest were CF (memory) and CTMT-1 (processing speed).  Results 
revealed a main effect of time, F(1,21) = 9.54, p = .006,   
  = .31.  There was no 
main effect of condition, F(1,21) = 0.06, p = .80,   
  = .00.   
Follow-up ANOVAs examining each dependent variable separately were 
conducted.  When CF was entered as the dependent variable, there was a main 
effect of time, F(1,21) = 14.20, p = .001,   
  = .40, but not condition, F(1,21) = 
0.06, p = .81,   
  = .00.  These results should be interpreted within the context of a 
significant interaction between time and condition, F(1,21) = 5.98, p = .02,   
  = 
.22, such that, as expected, memory performance improved in the treatment but 
not waitlist condition (see Figure 3).   
When CTMT-1 was entered as the dependent variable, there were no 
significant effects (all ps > .12).  Thus, as expected, processing speed did not 
change over time in either condition (see Figure 3). 
Predictors of treatment changes 
 Three hierarchical linear regressions were conducted as a preliminary 
examination of the hypothesized mechanism of change.  We were specifically 
interested in knowing whether the intervention was effective because of the 
specific beliefs which it targeted.  All participants across both study conditions 
(treatment and waitlist) were included in each analysis.  The relevant pre- 
assessment scores for each dependent variable of interest were entered in Step 1  
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Figure 3. Cognitive performance pre- and post- treatment/waiting, as measured 
by CF (Complex Figure) and CTMT-1 (Comprehensive Trail Making Test 
[Reynolds, 2002], Trail 1) T-scores. Asterisk indicates a significant interaction 
between time and condition: ** p < .01. 
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Table 8.  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression using Beliefs about Memory to Predict 
Post- Assessment Time Spent Checking 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE 
B 
Β B SE B β 
Pre- Time 
Spent 
Checking 
.56 .09 .79*** .59 .10 .82*** .73 .10 1.02*** 
Pre- DM-
BAM 
   .10 .15 .12 -
.38 
.24 -.45 
Pre- BAMI    -
.18 
.18 -.18 -
.10 
.26 -.10 
Post- DM-
BAM 
      .52 .23 .63* 
Post- 
BAMI 
      .16 .26 .13 
R2  .62   .64   .76  
F for R2 
change 
 35.44***   0.50   4.51*  
Note. BAMI = Beliefs about Memory Inventory (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2012); 
DM-BAM = average Daily Monitoring-Beliefs About Memory; * p < .05, *** p < 
.001.  
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of each analysis (see below).  Pre- assessment DM-BAM and BAMI scores were 
entered in Step 2, and post- assessment DM-BAM and BAMI scores were entered 
in Step 3 of all regressions. 
 To predict post- assessment time spent checking, pre- assessment time 
spent checking was entered as the Step 1 predictor.  The final model accounted 
for 76% of the variance and significantly predicted post- assessment time spent 
checking, F(5,18) = 11.22, p < .001.  Beliefs about memory contributed 
significant unique variance, although when examining the individual measures, 
only the contribution of average DM-BAM was a significant predictor of post- 
assessment time spent checking (see Table 8).  
 To predict post- assessment checking symptoms, the pre- assessment 
VOCI-check score was entered in Step 1.  The final model accounted for 86% of 
the variance and significantly predicted post- assessment VOCI-check scores,  
F(5,18) =22.58, p < .001.  Beliefs about memory contributed significant unique 
variance, although the contribution of average DM-BAM to the prediction of 
post- assessment VOCI-check scores was at trend-level only, and BAMI score 
was not a significant predictor (see Table 9).   
To predict post- assessment memory performance, pre- assessment CF 
scores was entered in Step 1.  The original model accounted for 67% of the 
variance and significantly predicted post- assessment CF scores, F(1,21) = 43.24, 
p < .001.  Beliefs about memory did not contribute significant additional variance 
and neither BAMI nor average DM-BAM scores were significant predictors of 
post- assessment CF scores (see Table 10).  As the small sample size suggests we 
were underpowered, it is worth noting that the beta weights for the belief about 
memory variables were in the expected direction.   
Discussion 
A preliminary pilot investigation of  a two session cognitive intervention 
targeting maladaptive beliefs about memory found it decreased these beliefs, time  
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Table 9.  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression using Beliefs about Memory to Predict 
Post- Assessment VOCI-Check Scores 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Pre- 
VOCI-
check 
.73 .12 .79*** .80 .10 .86*** .81 .09 .88*** 
Pre- DM-
BAM 
   .07 .03 .33* .00 .04 -.00 
Pre- 
BAMI 
   -
.13 
.03 -.52** -
.14 
.05 -.57* 
Post- DM-
BAM 
      .06 .04 .31+ 
Post- 
BAMI 
      .06 .05 .20 
R2  .63   .79   .86  
F for R2 
change 
 36.95***   8.11**   4.49*  
Note. BAMI = Beliefs about Memory Inventory (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2012); 
DM-BAM = average Daily Monitoring-Beliefs About Memory; VOCI-check = 
checking subscale of the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory 
(Thordarson et al., 2004); + p < .12, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 10.  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression using Beliefs about Memory to Predict 
Post- Assessment CF Scores 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE 
B 
β B SE 
B 
β 
Pre-CF 1.12 .17 .82*** 1.08 .17 .79*** 1.26 .19 .92*** 
Pre-DM-
BAM 
   -.16 .09 -.29++ -.03 .17 -.05 
Pre- 
BAMI 
   .17 .10 .25+ .29 .22 .42 
Post- 
DM-BAM 
      -.12 .14 -.21 
Post- 
BAMI 
      -.26 .23 -.32 
R2  .67   .73   .77  
F for R2 
change 
 43.24***   1.99   1.67  
Note. BAMI = Beliefs about Memory Inventory (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2012); 
DM-BAM = average Daily Monitoring-Beliefs About Memory; CF = Complex 
Figure; ++ p < .08, + p < .12, * p < .05, *** p < .001.  
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spent checking and symptoms, and  increased memory performance.  Further, we 
found some support for our prediction that the changes in beliefs about memory 
were responsible for post- assessment checking behaviour and symptoms.  These 
findings, although preliminary, are consistent with theory regarding the 
relationship between checking and memory beliefs (Rachman, 2002), as well as a 
host of previous research that has shown memory confidence and checking to be 
connected (e.g., van den Hout et al., 2003a,b, 2004; Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007).  
Moreover, they are consistent with experimental studies of the ability of 
maladaptive beliefs about memory to cause urges to check (Alcolado & 
Radomsky, 2011; Cuttler et al., 2013), and suggestions that they should be 
targeted in treatment (e.g., Radomsky et al., 2010; Shafran et al., 2013).  The 
increase in non-verbal recall performance is also consistent with previous 
suppositions that negative beliefs about one’s memory could undermine 
performance (e.g., Cougle et al., 2007; Radomsky, Rachman, & Hammond, 
2001), and that any deficits seen are more likely to be a secondary consequence, 
rather than causal (Nedeljkovic, 2006; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010; Radomsky, 
Dugas, et al., 2014).  They also offer a possible explanation for why a recent CBT 
outcome trial found that individuals with OCD improved their spatial working 
memory following treatment (Nedeljkovic, Kyrios, Moulding, & Doron, 2011), 
although their intervention did not specifically target or measure beliefs about 
memory.  The current findings are in contrast to recent experimental studies (in 
student samples) that did not find increasing memory confidence to decrease 
checking (Jennings, Nedeljkovic, & Moulding, 2011) or to increase memory 
performance (FitzGerald, Nedeljkovic, Moulding, & Kyrios, 2011).   
In the current study, regression analyses did not show beliefs about 
memory to predict post- assessment memory performance.  This may have been 
due to low power, caused by our small sample size.  Alternatively, perhaps 
memory performance improvements were due to decreases in anxiety; although if 
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that were the case, we would have expected to see improvements in processing 
speed as well, as processing speed and anxiety are related (e.g.,  
Mathews & McLeod, 1985; Egloff & Hoff, 2001).  Replication of these findings 
and further investigations are needed to clarify these issues, and also to more 
strongly ascertain the reliability of the current results.  
This investigation is not without limitations.  As this was the first 
examination of the intervention, a waitlist control was deemed appropriate for this 
pilot and exploratory investigation.  The use of such a control however, makes it 
difficult to conclusively determine whether any observed changes were due to 
changes in beliefs about memory, or to nonspecific therapeutic factors; 
nonetheless all participants, regardless of condition assignment, completed daily 
self-monitoring, so we can be confident that this was not the source of 
improvements in the treatment condition (for a review, see Korotitsch & Nelson-
Gray, 1999).  Further, the small sample size precluded our ability to definitively 
determine the predictors of changes seen in the current study.  There were also 
measurement limitations in this investigation.  In order to precisely capture the 
construct of maladaptive beliefs about memory, we utilized the BAMI (Alcolado 
& Radomsky, 2012), a scale that is still in development and which has not yet 
been validated in a clinical sample.  Additionally, our secondary measure of 
beliefs about memory, taken from the daily monitoring forms, was a 1-item 
measure.   
To our knowledge, this is the first study to develop and test the effects of 
an intervention specifically focused on beliefs about memory.  It was also the first 
time, to our knowledge, that the effects of treatment on recall performance were 
examined specifically within compulsive checkers, rather than in a heterogeneous 
OCD sample, since memory deficits have been theoretically linked particularly to 
checking and doubt (e.g., Tallis et al., 1997).  
76 
 
 
These results, if replicable, have several important implications.  It 
appears that targeting beliefs about memory in compulsive checking can be 
effective at reducing these symptoms, and therefore further replication and 
investigation into the effectiveness of this intervention are warranted.  The current 
findings also suggest maladaptive beliefs about memory may be an important 
belief domain in OCD.  These results also lend further credence to the view that 
individuals with OCD do not have inherent memory deficits, but rather that lower 
scores on tests of memory may result from negative beliefs about memory.  
Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of the neuropsychological literature on OCD 
(Abramovitch, Abramowitz & Mittelman, 2013) supported the theory that visual 
memory impairments are likely accounted for by executive dysfunction (Savage 
et al., 1999), but more importantly, that none of the dysfunctions seen in any of 
the cognitive domains appeared to be clinically relevant.  Given recent findings 
on the extreme prevalence of doubting intrusions worldwide (Radomsky et al., 
2014), the development of an intervention targeting a maladaptive beliefs about 
memory, a potential source of doubt, is timely. 
Future research should endeavour to determine the value of the current 
treatment module for treating compulsive checking as integrated within the 
context of a larger treatment package.  Indeed, such a study is currently underway 
in Montreal.  With respect to improving upon the current design, the inclusion of 
follow-up assessment points and comparison to an active treatment control would 
allow for stronger conclusions regarding the durability and effectiveness of the 
intervention.  Another important avenue of investigation would be to determine 
whether this component of treatment is useful for anyone who checks 
compulsively, or only certain individuals, e.g., those with pre-existing 
maladaptive beliefs about their memory.  More broadly, this intervention has not 
yet been tested for its utility to decrease other types of obsessive or compulsive 
symptoms that are repetitive, such as compulsive washing.  Finally, it is probable 
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that changing beliefs about memory could also have important transdiagnostic 
implications.  Reassurance seeking, a common extension of compulsive checking 
(Rachman, 2002), is also extremely repetitive in nature.  Therefore it is possible 
that individuals who seek reassurance suffer from the same decrements in 
metamemory as seen in repeated checking.  As such, an intervention that builds 
confidence in knowledge gleaned only once, could also help reduce reassurance 
seeking in the context of OCD and beyond, such as in social and generalized 
anxiety disorder (Cougle et al., 2012), and in depression (Joiner & Metalsky, 
2001).  This intervention shows early promise to enhance effective treatments for 
compulsive checking and potentially other symptom domains associated with 
doubt and/or repetition. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This program of research was designed to evaluate the role of beliefs 
about memory in compulsive checking first by developing a tool to measure them, 
and then by assessing a novel cognitive-behavioural intervention for checking 
focused on re-evaluating these maladaptive beliefs.  I sought to determine the 
ability of the intervention to reduce checking and increase memory performance 
in a sample of compulsive checkers.  The need for these studies became apparent 
when the role for beliefs about memory in checking had been elaborated on in 
theoretical (Rachman, 2002), psychometric (Cuttler, Alcolado, & Taylor, 2013; 
Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007; Nedeljkovic, Moulding, Kyrios, & Doron, 2009) 
and experimental (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011; Cuttler, Sirois-Delisle, Alcolado, 
Radomsky, & Taylor, 2013) research.  Further, it has been suggested that these 
beliefs may explain (Cougle, Salkovskis, & Wahl, 2007; Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010) the mixed findings in the neuropsychiatric literature on memory 
performance in OCD (e.g., Muller & Roberts, 2005).  Finally, it seemed this was a 
neglected area in OCD-related cognition as this type of belief was not viewed as 
central to the disorder, nor was there a tool uniquely designed to capture it 
(OCCWG, 2005).  Thus, Study 1 was a psychometric study that developed and 
tested the preliminary psychometric properties of the Beliefs About Memory 
Inventory (BAMI), allowing for assessment of this construct, and Study 2 was a 
pilot intervention study wherein individuals received 2 sessions of cognitive-
behavioural therapy focused on maladaptive beliefs about memory.   
Summary of findings 
 Study 1.  In order to develop the BAMI, a large sample of undergraduate 
participants completed it within a battery of other measures which assessed 
related constructs.  The measure was found to have two factors: beliefs about 
memory ability and beliefs about the importance of memory.  This was in partial 
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contrast to my hypotheses, as I expected a third factor relating to memory 
reliability to emerge, but these items were either removed or subsumed into the 
memory ability category as a result of the factor analytic process.  The measure, 
however, displayed good convergent and divergent validity, as it was more highly 
and significantly correlated with measures of meta-cognition than other more 
general mood constructs, including depression and social anxiety.  It also 
exhibited excellent internal consistency and adequate retest reliability over a long 
period.  Finally, and most importantly, the BAMI was able to predict compulsive 
checking over and above other belief domains known to be relevant to OCD, 
extending previous work on the role of memory confidence in checking (e.g., 
Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007).  These findings add an entirely new candidate 
belief domain to those considered central to OCD (OCCWG, 2005), whose 
specificity to checking has already been demonstrated, unlike the belief domains 
assessed in the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OCCWG, 2005; see Tolin, 
Brady, & Hannon, 2008).    
 Study 2.  Crucially, the results from Study 1 (see Chapter 2) allowed for 
the measurement of beliefs about memory in the Study 2 (see Chapter 4) 
preliminary pilot treatment investigation.  A sample of individuals with obsessive-
compulsive disorder who reported clinically significant checking behaviour were 
randomly assigned to either a treatment condition where they received two 
sessions of a novel cognitive intervention regarding beliefs about memory or to a 
waitlist control condition.  Immediate visuospatial recall and processing speed 
were also measured at pre- and post- assessment visits.  Results demonstrated that 
those individuals in the treatment condition decreased their maladaptive beliefs 
about memory, as well as their time spent checking and checking symptoms, as 
compared to individuals in the waitlist condition.  Further, immediate visuospatial 
memory performance improved from pre- to post- assessment in the treatment but 
not the waitlist condition, while processing speed remained stable throughout in 
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both conditions.  Importantly, beliefs about memory at the post- assessment were 
predictive of improvements in post- assessment symptoms and time spent 
checking, although not of memory performance.  Thus, this study was the first to 
demonstrate that beliefs about memory can be challenged in cognitive therapy, 
and moreover, that doing so can decrease checking symptoms.  Of course, as this 
was a small n study with a waitlist design, replication is needed to determine the 
reliability of the results.  
Limitations and strengths 
 The implications of these findings, should, of course be tempered by the 
acknowledgement that this body of research was not without its limitations.  
Firstly, the BAMI is a measure that is still under development, and as such, the 
finding from Study 1 that it was able to predict checking may be premature until 
its properties and its power to predict checking have been replicated.  (In fact, 
further changes have been made to the measure and evaluation of a newer version 
of the BAMI is now underway.)  Further to this point, its use in Study 2 as the 
main measure of this construct also limits the implications of the successful 
results of the novel cognitive intervention.   
 Another important limitation of this work relates to the clinical sample.  
First of all, the number of participants in both studies was quite small, due in part 
to recruitment difficulties, but also because of the design of the treatment study.  
The intervention was purposely tested in a pilot fashion due to its novel nature.  
Secondly, both studies lacked clinical control groups.  The inclusion of an anxious 
control, depressive control and/or a non-checking OCD control group(s) would 
have allowed me to not only determine the relationship of beliefs about memory 
to compulsive checking, but also to elucidate its specificity/generalizability 
to/beyond this symptom type.   
A final design limitation with respect to the treatment study was the use of 
a waitlist control condition, which, although appropriate for this preliminary and 
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exploratory investigation of a novel intervention, limits the interpretability of the 
results.  As such, I was not able to control for non-specific therapeutic factors 
(e.g., warmth of therapist, regular meetings) or improvements due to the passage 
of time. This limited the extent to which I could be confident in the effectiveness 
of this novel intervention.  Future studies should include a randomized controlled 
trial (RCT) or another study design which incorporates an active control treatment 
condition (see below).  
There are also several strengths of this program of research that allowed 
me to cautiously draw some conclusions and implications (see below).  Firstly, 
the use of a specific sample of individuals with OCD who exhibit clinical levels 
of checking behaviour (rather than allowing a more a heterogeneous symptom 
presentation) aids in determining the extent to which beliefs about memory are 
associated specifically with checking, rather than with OCD in general.  
Regarding Study 1, the main strength in the design was the use of a very large 
sample, making the study well-powered for conducting the exploratory factor 
analysis.  With respect to Study 2, the decision to evaluate a specific component 
of treatment (and drawing from cognitive-behavioural theory to develop it), rather 
than evaluating a treatment package, which may have effective and non-effective 
elements, was a unique decision.  This provides the advantage to any clinician 
wishing to use this intervention that the specific techniques developed herein are 
to some extent, evidence-based, and therefore would probably be useful in 
symptom reduction, bearing in mind the limitations noted above. 
Theoretical implications 
 Broadly, the main theoretical implication of this body of work is the 
relevance of maladaptive beliefs about memory to checking and doubting 
phenomenology (e.g., OCCWG, 1997).  We can now measure this construct 
reliably, allowing increased theoretical understanding of the mechanisms of 
compulsive checking, and alter it in treatment, fostering the amelioration of 
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symptoms.  These findings are consistent with the cognitive theory of compulsive 
checking (Rachman, 2002), which implies that negative beliefs about memory 
may propel one to check.  The findings replicate and extend previous research 
demonstrating that these beliefs do seem to have the power to contribute to 
checking.  The link between checking and beliefs about memory has been found 
psychometrically, where a related but distinct construct, memory confidence, 
predicted checking symptoms more strongly than other constructs (e.g., 
Nedeljkovic & Kyrios, 2007).  This link has also been demonstrated 
experimentally, as participants led to believe they had poor memory had stronger 
urges to check than those who were told they had good memory (e.g., Alcolado & 
Radomsky, 2011).  There also exists a hypothesis regarding low confidence in 
more general convictions, not just memory, that may exist in OCD, and checking 
specifically (Dar, 2003).  This proposition has now been supported by research in 
non-clinical and clinical samples demonstrating decreased confidence on general 
knowledge tasks and increased vulnerability to false biofeedback (see Dar, 2004; 
Lazarov, Dar, Oded, & Liberman, 2010; Lazarov, Liberman, Hermesh, & Dar, 
2014).  The current results are certainly consistent with these findings.  How 
much overlap there is between general distrust of one’s general convictions and 
distrust of memory, and which may be more central to the development of 
checking, are theoretical and empirical questions that remain to be resolved 
moving forward.  Nevertheless, future efforts to refine our understanding of the 
nature of compulsive checking should naturally include the 
consideration/incorporation of maladaptive beliefs about memory, by assessing 
their contribution to predicting symptoms and outcome in research and treatment 
investigations (see below for more detailed suggestions).   
 More specifically, the results of Study 1 extend previous psychometric 
findings demonstrating that low meta-memory can predict checking (Nedeljkovic 
& Kyrios, 2007), by showing that maladaptive beliefs about memory (ability and 
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importance) can predict checking, over and above known-relevant belief domains 
in OCD.  Thus, rather than targeting meta-cognition, a broad construct, a more 
clinically germane and specific target would be beliefs about memory, which, for 
example, could be focused on through cognitive-behavioural investigations of and 
interventions for compulsive checking.  As such, beliefs about memory are a 
novel belief domain that should be considered when conducting assessments for 
compulsive checking, whether it be within the context of more fully 
understanding the variables to be studied or when conceptualizing a given client’s 
case for the purposes of planning treatment.  
The results of Study 2, although preliminary, have important implications 
for current psychological treatments for compulsive checking.  As suggested in a 
recent theoretical article (Radomsky et al., 2010), an intervention focused on 
beliefs about memory can indeed prove to be effective at decreasing checking 
symptoms.  Indeed, this is not surprising given that there are other treatments for 
OCD targeting doubt more broadly which have had good success (O’Connor et 
al., 2005).  Therefore a module focusing on psychoeducation and changing 
maladaptive beliefs about memory may be a fruitful component to incorporate in 
future treatment packages for those who suffer from compulsive checking, 
particularly those who express pre-existing beliefs that they have poor memory 
abilities and/or that an optimally functioning memory is personally significant and 
important.  The intervention need not be limited to individuals with these beliefs, 
however, and may have clinical utility beyond symptoms of checking.  These are 
empirical questions which need to be addressed in future research (see below).   
 There are also several implications regarding the neuropsychological 
findings reported in Study 2.  Firstly, with respect to the aetiological relevance of 
memory deficits in OCD (e.g., Tallis, 1997), the current findings do not support 
this premise, as the intervention altered (i.e., improved) memory performance.  If 
a memory deficit were a precursor or risk factor to developing OCD, one would 
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not expect poor memory accuracy in a clinical sample to be malleable 
(particularly as the intervention did not provide any type of memory training).  
Indeed, it should not be surprising that memory performance is malleable.  These 
findings mirror results from other areas of psychological investigations of 
memory, as memory performance has been shown to be impacted by activating 
stereotypes and by offering monetary rewards (Levy & Leiftheit-Limson, 2009; 
Murayama & Kuhbandner, 2011).  Moreover, beliefs about memory are already 
considered an important factor in neuropsychological testing in older adults where 
such negative beliefs have been found to influence memory performance (see 
Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011, for a review).   
Secondly, these results shed some light on previous mixed findings in the 
literature (see Muller & Roberts, 2005, for a review).  Perhaps as previously 
suggested (e.g., Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010), doubt can negatively influence 
performance.  This may be why some studies of repeated checking have found 
small but significant decrements in memory performance (e.g., Ashbaugh & 
Radomsky, 2007; Coles et al., 2006; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010), and why 
some neuropsychological studies have found memory deficits in OCD (e.g., Sher, 
Man & Frost, 1984).  Clearly, however, this effect is not uniform or consistent, as 
other repeated checking studies have failed to find such problems in memory 
performance (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a,b; 2004), and other studies of 
memory in OCD have failed to find neuropsychological deficits (e.g., Radomsky 
& Rachman, 1999).  The current body of research may clarify why these findings 
have been inconsistent, by illuminating that perhaps doubt is only able to affect 
memory performance in those who have or acquire maladaptive beliefs about 
their memory ability (although this supposition has not yet been tested).  These 
findings are also consistent with a recent meta-analytic review demonstrating that 
memory deficits are probably non-existent in OCD and definitely not of clinical 
relevance (Abramovitch, Abramowitz, & Mittelman, 2013).   
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Finally, these results may help explain the mechanism by which previous 
treatment studies have found memory improvements following CBT for OCD 
(e.g., Nedeljkovic, Kyrios, Moulding, & Doron, 2011), i.e., perhaps beliefs about 
memory may shift during the learning that takes place over the course of therapy. 
Clinical implications 
This research has several important clinical implications.  Generally 
speaking, there is a growing body of evidence that demonstrates the importance of 
interpretations of and beliefs about memory to understanding the nature of 
compulsive checking.  Thus, this construct warrants clinical attention during 
assessment and treatment of checking-related symptomatology. 
Study 1’s clinical relevance pertains to the BAMI, as this questionnaire 
will allow these beliefs to be measured in clinical treatment studies and may help 
elucidate potential mechanisms of change.  Further, for the clinician, the BAMI 
can be used for screening purposes in potential patients and clients who present 
with OCD and/or compulsive checking symptoms in order to determine whether 
targeting maladaptive beliefs about memory should be included in the 
intervention plan. 
Study 2`s preliminary results could have the clearest implications for 
treatment as the results demonstrated that intervening with respect to beliefs bout 
memory has great potential to be effective for those who check excessively.  
Further study of this treatment module (see below) may lead to improvements in 
cognitive interventions for OCD, which until now have not shown to improve 
upon existing behavioural interventions, as was hoped (see Clark, 2005, for a 
review).   Further study may also, and more importantly perhaps, improve upon 
the previously studied belief domains (OCCWG, 2005) targeted in cognitive 
therapy (Clark, 2003).  These domains have recently been shown not to be as 
specific to OCD as was theorized (Tolin, Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2006), and 
furthermore not to consistently predict checking/doubting symptoms (Tolin, et. al, 
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2008).  This may help explain why targeting them in therapy has not improved 
upon previous behavioural interventions (see Rosa-Alcásar et al., 2008, for a 
review).  Moreover, the specific cognitive interventions related to beliefs about 
memory may likely be more helpful than previous intervention techniques 
suggested to aid meta-memory in compulsive checkers.   For example, it was 
previously suggested the best way to compensate for decreased meta-memory 
would be to check more carefully to create distinctive memories (Tallis, 1997).  
This effect has been demonstrated, as changing visual cues during checks does 
attenuates decreased memory confidence (Boschen, Wilson, & Farrell, 2011); 
however, any benefit of such an approach would likely be transient, as eventually 
this new type of memory would lose its distinctiveness.  Further, this technique 
would be directly counter-therapeutic to behavioural intervention strategies, 
wherein one is trying to reduce, rather than increase, ritualistic behaviour (such as 
constantly changing the environment to help encode the memory of the check; see 
Kozak & Coles, 2005, for a review).  Another recommendation related to the 
decreased meta-memory literature has been to help individuals who compulsively 
check to accept that their meta-memory is not good (van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003b).  The current intervention goes beyond that to building beliefs in a strong 
memory despite the decreased meta-memorial phenomenon.  Therefore, the 
current research suggests a much more clinically appropriate and useful 
intervention than those previously suggested in this area.    
Implications for other psychopathologies  
 The current body of work also has potential implications outside of 
compulsive checking, and indeed beyond OCD.  One can imagine that if the 
belief that one has a poor memory can increase repetitive checking, perhaps such 
beliefs may induce other repetitive behaviours.  For example, reassurance seeking 
is a construct understood to exist transdiagnostically, although differing in content 
among different disorders (e.g., Parrish & Radomsky, 2010).  Therefore it is 
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possible that those with depression, social anxiety, and/or generalized anxiety, 
may repeatedly seek reassurance repeatedly in part because they do not trust 
themselves to remember exactly the content of the previously received 
reassurance, or perhaps whether they actually really asked for it.  If so, this 
intervention may have relevance to these problems, and the BAMI may be of use 
in studying the phenomenon.  Although these are yet untested questions, 
empirical studies could be designed to address them (see below). 
Implications for non-psychopathological behaviour 
 These results could have implications outside the realm of 
psychopathology as well.  Firstly with respect to individuals who occasionally 
check in a subclinical manner, this kind of intervention/psychoeducation may be 
helpful in reducing or eliminating the occurrence of the occasional bout of 
checking.  Given that doubt is so ubiquitous in the population (Radomsky et al., 
2014), widespread psychoeducation could perhaps even prevent the development 
of pathological checking behaviour. 
Moving away from checking specifically and focusing on the repetitive 
aspect of such behaviour, there is also the possibility that individuals who do 
repetitive tasks in the course of their daily lives or work (e.g., assembly line 
workers, line cooks) may be susceptible to developing poor memory beliefs.  It 
would be interesting to test the applicability of the checking model, and indeed 
the impact of pre-existing or newly developed maladaptive beliefs about memory 
in these types of populations.  Might such individuals (over time) come to believe 
they cannot remember their tasks, and then perhaps over-perform, by repeatedly 
but unnecessarily checking their work?  Moreover, could such a phenomenon lead 
to mistakes at work (perhaps through checking one aspect of a task to the 
detriment of another aspect), and/or interfere with efficiency and productivity? 
  Perhaps most directly relevant are the implications for research in 
processes associated with learning and memory.  We know already that memory 
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performance can be altered by activating cognitive biases or introducing a reward 
(e.g., Levy & Leiftheit-Limson, 2009; Murayama & Kuhbandner, 2011).  It is 
possible that individuals who believe themselves to have ‘bad memories’ are 
over-performing  on memory tasks, i.e., checking their work, or repeating 
themselves, which may lead to un-optimal task performance (e.g., changing a 
correct selection in favour of an incorrect one) and therefore incorrect assessment 
of their abilities.  This could affect scores on several different types of memory 
tests.  For example, in a test of recognition memory, where one typically has to 
choose between a yes/no response, and does not trust one’s memory, second-
guessing might reduce one’s performance.  Similarly, during tests of recall 
memory, poor memory beliefs could interfere with retrieval by reducing the 
confidence that one has in the memory that was retrieved.  As such, individuals 
with such beliefs might start to question the information they have recalled, 
perhaps even before they communicate a response.  They may speculate, 
erroneously, that they are recalling information from an unrelated occasion, or 
question whether they recalled an altered or incomplete version of the 
information, which could result in non-use of the correctly retrieved response.   I 
can also envision that these beliefs could interfere at the encoding stage of 
memory.  If one has low confidence in one’s memory, one might perseverate on 
early items or aspects to recall in an unnecessary act of compensation for 
perceived poor ability, and therefore fail to encode the pertinent details.  If this is 
occurring, there are implications for the daily lives of such individuals, as well as 
for research which seeks to study so-called ‘normal’ memory processes.  
Furthermore, this may have implications for those studying the difference 
between normal memory and abnormal memory, such as in aging research, where 
it is already known that poor memory confidence interferes with performance 
(Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011, for a review).  An intervention such as the one 
presented in Study 2 may be very helpful for both researchers interested in 
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studying aging and memory and individuals who suffer from age-related memory 
decline/neuropsychological memory deficits.  
Future directions  
 There are a number of questions that emerge from the results of this body 
of work.  First of all, with respect to the measurement of beliefs about memory, 
the current questionnaire could be refined to better capture its second factor, 
beliefs about the importance of memory, which is currently under-represented in 
the BAMI.  This could be accomplished through the development of more items 
that assess beliefs about the importance of memory, and conducting subsequent 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses to create a more succinct, balanced 
measure with strong psychometric properties.  In fact, this process is already 
under way, as data is currently being collected on a newer version of the BAMI 
which contains more items potentially related to beliefs about the importance of 
memory.  Once this is completed, future investigations could better determine 
whether both beliefs about memory ability and beliefs about memory importance 
are central to checking, or whether one belief type can better predict checking, 
and moreover, which belief type is best targeted in treatment.  Based on the 
current results where the overall scale but not the individual subscales best 
predicted checking, I would hypothesize that both beliefs about memory ability 
and beliefs about the importance of memory are necessary but not sufficient to 
predict checking behaviour, i.e., that individuals who have both types of distorted 
beliefs are those who check compulsively.   
A longitudinal investigation wherein both the BAMI and measures of 
checking symptoms are administered could help determine the aetiological nature 
of these maladaptive beliefs.  That is, whether individuals begin checking 
compulsively due to pre-existing beliefs they have a bad memory, or whether 
these beliefs solely develop as a result of the detrimental effects of repeated 
checking (see van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a).  In the current theory (Rachman, 
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2002), both possibilities are left open.  More long-term projects could include 
testing the relevancy of the measure and its constructs to other obsessive-
compulsive symptom domains, such as whether such beliefs predict onset, 
maintenance, or severity of washing, ordering, etc. 
The next logical step with respect to the intervention would be to compare 
its effectiveness to that of an active control condition, rather than to a waitlist, 
using a small RCT design.  It would also be useful to know whether this 
intervention is fruitful only for those who come in with these pre-existing 
maladaptive beliefs about their memory in order to best target therapy for a given 
individual.  Although the current study was not powered to examine this, I would 
propose that the intervention would be most (but not exclusively) helpful to those 
who have pre-existing maladaptive beliefs about memory  Further to this point, 
Study 2’s treatment module contained two distinct sessions, one focused on 
memory for checking, and the other focused more on memory in general.  I would 
hypothesize that for those who come in with existing beliefs that they have a bad 
memory, the second session would be most helpful as it focuses on general 
memory abilities.  Those who do not have such beliefs, however, may still benefit 
particularly from session one to boost their trust in their memory for previously 
completed checks.  This would merely be a new useful way of responding to the 
doubting thoughts that they may not have previously considered.  This could be 
easily tested within a larger sample wherein the BAMI beliefs could be measured 
prior to treatment to determine whether ratings on the scale differentially 
impacted treatment outcome. 
In the longer-term, I would want to determine the utility of the current 
intervention within the context of a full CBT treatment package as it was never 
meant as a standalone treatment, but instead, as a useful component to be added to 
existing effective therapies.  Specifically, I would want to discover whether the 
module adds anything to our current treatments?  Further, might it be useful at 
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eliminating other types of symptoms?  Does it matter at which point in the 
intervention the module is delivered? 
Study 2 (Chapter 4) focused primarily on delivering an intervention based 
on maladaptive beliefs about memory ability.  Another future direction would be 
to develop an intervention module that focuses more directly on examining and 
intervening with respect to the importance of memory.  To what extent such a 
module would ameliorate the suffering of obsessive-compulsive checkers and 
others (see below) is unknown in the current study.  As both constructs predicted 
checking (see Study 1, Chapter 2), a treatment that includes challenging both 
types of beliefs would likely be superior to one which targets either alone. 
More broadly, while the role for beliefs about memory has been 
demonstrated in the context of compulsive checking, what remains to be seen is 
whether there is any role for beliefs about memory in other compulsions.  For 
example, as mentioned above, perhaps beliefs about memory may have some 
impact on other repetitive symptoms of OCD, such as washing, ordering or 
arranging.  Even if this new belief domain proves to be predictive of these 
symptoms, it is plausible that other beliefs more closely tied to the behaviours 
may better explain these symptoms than maladaptive beliefs about memory.  
Despite this, it would be worth investigating whether the intervention could be 
helpful for those struggling with these other symptoms of OCD.  It is possible that 
it would aid those individuals who engage in repetitive rituals and who also have 
poor beliefs about their memory.  For others, they may remember having arranged 
the objects on a shelf, for example, but other types of beliefs may propel them to 
repeatedly re-order it.  In this type of case an intervention focused on memory 
might not be directly relevant to the problem, however, perhaps the knowledge 
that repeated actions become less clear could still be helpful in reducing repeated 
engagement with the compulsion.  A future treatment study wherein the 
intervention is modified and implemented for a heterogeneous group of 
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individuals with OCD (who do not compulsively check) would clarify these 
questions.   
Finally, maladaptive beliefs about memory may have broader 
transdiagnostic implications, which could be the subject of future theoretical and 
treatment investigations.  There are many disorders, including OCD, in which 
reassurance seeking, called checking “by proxy” (Parrish & Radomsky, 2006, 
2011; Rachman, 2002) is common, such as in depression (Joiner & Metalsky, 
2001) and other anxiety disorders (Cougle et al., 2012).  It would be interesting 
and potentially quite useful to assess and determine if this intervention could be 
implemented to reduce reassurance seeking.     
In summary, the emergence of beliefs about memory ability/importance, 
and their link to compulsive checking promise to enrich our understanding, 
assessment, and treatment of OCD.  Future investigations of this construct would 
clarify whether maladaptive beliefs about memory contribute to processes 
underlying other obsessive-compulsive symptoms, as well as beyond to symptoms 
of other psychopathologies and indeed normal behaviour and memory.  In the 
interim, the BAMI and related intervention techniques could aid in answering 
these questions and potentially contribute towards improving evidence-based 
psychotherapies for compulsive checking.  
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Appendix A 
Beliefs About Memory Inventory (Potential Items) 
BAMI 
This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs that people sometimes 
hold.  Read each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree 
with it. 
For each of the statements, choose the number matching the answer that 
best describes how you think.  Because people are different, there are no right or 
wrong answers. 
To decide whether a given statement is typical of your way of looking at 
things, simply keep in mind what you are like most of the time.   
Use the following scale: 
1                      2                     3                  4                     5                      6 
disagree disagree disagree agree  agree  agree 
very much moderately   a little a little        moderately      very much 
In making your ratings, try to avoid using the middle point of the scale (4), 
but rather indicate whether you usually disagree or agree with the statements 
about your own beliefs and attitudes. 
1. A poor memory means I’m dangerous   1   2   3   4   5   6 
2. Memory plays the most important role in my life  1   2   3   4   5   6 
3. When I can’t remember something it bothers me a lot 1   2   3   4   5   6 
4. A weak memory can interfere with your life  1   2   3   4   5   6 
5. Without a good memory, you don’t make much   
progress in life      1   2   3   4   5   6 
6. I am good at remembering important events  1   2   3   4   5   6 
7. A good memory is a sign of intelligence   1   2   3   4   5   6 
8. Often my memory turns out to have been incorrect 1   2   3   4   5   6 
9. When I try I can remember exactly what I’ve seen 1   2   3   4   5   6 
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10. I have a good memory     1   2   3   4   5   6 
11. Memories are facts that don’t change over time  1   2   3   4   5   6 
12. It is important that I am able to clearly remember  
how to do things          1   2   3   4   5   6 
13. My memory is like a website, the content is always           
changing between accesses     1   2   3   4   5   6 
14. My memory always plays tricks on me   1   2   3   4   5   6 
15. When I can’t remember something, it means I’m 
a bad person       1   2   3   4   5   6 
16. Memories are never false     1   2   3   4   5   6 
17. My memory can be trusted most of the time  1   2   3   4   5   6 
18. When I’m tired I should never rely on my memory 1   2   3   4   5   6 
19. Memory cannot be trusted to be accurate and true 1   2   3   4   5   6 
20. Memories are always true     1   2   3   4   5   6 
21. A poor memory means I am at risk of becoming an  
irresponsible person      1   2   3   4   5   6 
22. When I try to remember something I have seen I  
always remember it well     1   2   3   4   5   6 
23. My memories don’t change over time   1   2   3   4   5   6 
24. I find that I usually can’t remember what I’ve just  
done, even when it’s really important   1   2   3   4   5   6 
25. My memory is like a library full of books, I can  
always access the same non-changing information  1   2   3   4   5   6 
26. My memory is not an accurate representation of  
my true experiences      1   2   3   4   5   6 
27. When I’m stressed I should never rely on my  
memory to be consistent     1   2   3   4   5   6 
28. I have trouble remembering important actions  1   2   3   4   5   6 
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29. No matter how much I try I always seem to forget  
what I’ve done      1   2   3   4   5   6 
30. Being able to clearly remember past events is  
important       1   2   3   4   5   6 
31. Having a good memory is the key to success  1   2   3   4   5   6 
32. When I try to remember what I have done I find I 
have forgotten it/been incorrect    1   2   3   4   5   6 
33. When I can’t remember something, it means I am  
stupid        1   2   3   4   5   6 
34. My memory captures everything that happens to me  
in perfect detail      1   2   3   4   5   6 
35. Memory can save lives     1   2   3   4   5   6 
36. A poor memory means I am a bad person  1   2   3   4   5   6 
37. I have a poor memory     1   2   3   4   5   6 
38. Even when I try to remember something I have seen                 
I find I can’t remember it well    1   2   3   4   5   6 
39. I can’t rely on my memory    1   2   3   4   5   6 
40. No matter how much I try I can’t remember to do  
things that I need to do     1   2   3   4   5   6 
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Appendix B 
Beliefs About Memory Treatment Protocol 
Preamble Guidelines for Treatment Manual: 
 Exact wording/content need not be standardized. Each treatment 
component/principle should be covered with all participants, but examples 
can be idiosyncratic and the Socratic questions/guided discovery will 
depend on the participant’s responses. 
 Although portions of the script below are written as if the participant were 
mute, this is for example purposes to show the content that must be 
instructed. It is important to introduce each principle using Socratic 
questioning/guided discovery so that the participant can be an active one 
and so that the treatment will be collaborative (see General Therapist 
Characteristics below). For example, rather than stating that checking is 
universal, ask the participant what they know about checking, how 
common do they think it is, etc., and then provide the information. 
Another example is when explaining the research, rather than stating the 
results right away, ask them what they think would happen. 
General Therapist Characteristics to keep in mind (from CTS): 
1. Set the Agenda (Yes – Set at the beginning of each session) 
2. Elicit Feedback (Yes – check at each section ending, ask patient to summarize 
session and report which part was most important to verify what they understood) 
3. Understanding the Patient (Not explicitly, but implied)  
4. Interpersonal Effectiveness (Not explicitly, but implied) 
5. Collaboration (In the agenda, ask if those topics are okay) 
6. Pacing and efficient use of time (Yes – structure and pacing will be 
standardized) 
7. Guided discovery (Yes – the discussion sections, homework assignments, and 
homework reviews are set up in this manner) 
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8. Focus on key cognitions or behaviours (Yes - The therapy is based on a single 
belief) 
9. Strategy for change (Yes it’s appropriate – psychoeducation & behavioural 
experiments) 
10. Application of CB techniques (Not explicitly, but implied) 
11. Homework (Yes – after each session) 
Treatment Session 1: 
The purpose of this visit is to collect the daily monitoring forms that the 
participant has brought in, to have them complete the questionnaires, and to have 
the first treatment session. During the visit they will: 
1) Hand in their daily monitoring form 
2) Complete the VOCIcheck and the BAMI; Medication and suicidality check-in 
3) Undergo Treatment Session 1(audio record with two devices) 
 
1) “Do you have your checking monitoring form? Thank you very much for 
completing this. As you know this is a vital part of our study and we appreciate 
your cooperation, as we could not continue without this part. Did you have any 
difficulties with it this week, or any questions about how to complete it?” 
2) “Please complete these two questionnaires and then we will get started. There 
are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. Please do not spend too 
much time on any one question; usually your first instinct is the best answer. Do 
you have any questions?” (Complete VOCIcheck & BAMI) “I just have a couple 
of more questions before we get started. (If on medication at intake) Have you 
changed your medication or dose since our last appointment?” (If suicidality was 
identified at intake) “Have you been having any suicidal thoughts this week? 
More than usual? Do you have a plan?” 
3) Treatment Session 1 components: (Start audio recorders)  
A) Introduction 
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a. Bridge: Thank you for completing the questionnaires. We are 
now ready to start our treatment sessions. 
b. Overview: These two treatment sessions will involve some 
education about checking and memory, and some discussions 
about your checking and memory. This therapy uses a 
cognitive-behavioural approach, which means we are interested 
in the link between your thoughts (or cognitions), behaviours, 
and emotions, and the effect they all have on each other. Our 
behaviour is influenced by our thoughts and emotions, and in 
turn our behaviour affects our subsequent thoughts and 
emotions. So if we can examine and adjust some current ways 
of thinking this should change your emotions and behaviour. 
Similarly if we examine and modify some current behaviour, 
this should also change your thoughts and emotions. Are you 
aware of the difference between a thought and an emotion? 
Sometimes they come really fast together and it can be hard to 
tease them apart. Let’s do an example now together to see if 
that makes sense. (Draw triangle). Can you remember a recent 
time that you checked? What thoughts where you having? 
What emotions? What did you end up doing? That means I will 
be asking you about the thoughts, feelings and emotions that 
you experience around your checking behaviour. I will be 
asking you about your experiences and impressions because the 
cognitive-behavioural approach is a collaborative one where 
we will discuss your issues together and come to a consensus 
about them. Finally, we will attempt to be scientists, and create 
hypotheses about at least one of the reasons why you might 
check, and conduct experiments to gather evidence that will 
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either support or disconfirm our hypotheses/predictions. Do 
you have any questions? 
B) Agenda: We are now ready to start today’s treatment session. Today 
we are going to cover three topics. We will start with a 
psychoeducation (1) component where I will give you some 
information about what we know and understand from research about 
the relationship between checking and memory. Then we’ll have a 
discussion (2) to try to reach an understanding together about your 
beliefs about your memory ability, and about how those beliefs might 
relate to your checking behaviour. We’ll finish by discussing and 
practicing a between-session exercise (3) that I will ask you to 
complete before our next session (this is important, because it will help 
you make the most of our in-session conversation). Does that sound 
alright? Do you have any questions? Is there anything I’ve said with 
which you disagree?  
C) Psychoeducation:  
a. Universality of checking: Checking behaviour is extremely 
common, if not universal. Like many symptoms of anxiety 
disorders, it exists on a continuum whereby most people check 
at some point in their lives over certain things, but it only 
becomes a problem if the time spent checking begins to 
interfere with your daily life and causes distress. Do you have 
any questions about that? Does it make sense to you?  Can you 
think of one or two things that nearly everybody checks? 
b. Cognitive theory of checking: I’d like to share the theory now. 
It’s important to go through our understanding of how 
checking works because the first step to change is 
understanding where it comes from so we know what needs to 
115 
 
 
be changed. A cognitive theory (meaning about the mind, 
rather than a biological theory meaning about hormones and 
chemicals and genes) has been developed to explain excessive 
checking behaviour, and part of that theory includes something 
called the self-perpetuating cycle of checking. We can imagine 
that individuals who check must be doing so for a reason. Do 
you have any idea what some of the reasons could be for your 
checking? For some people, the theory suggests that their 
checking may be in part because they have a doubt, have low 
confidence in their memory, or a belief that their memory is 
poor or flawed in some way. (That fits with our earlier 
discussion about the link between thoughts and behaviours – 
the doubting thought is one that can cause checking behaviour.) 
The theory also suggests however, that the act of checking 
itself is actually quite paradoxical, because even though 
individuals may be checking to become more certain, the act of 
checking actually might reduce certainty so that the more you 
check the less certain you become. (Draw the cycle) Now if 
you’re feeling more uncertain, what are you going to do? You 
may guess that this continued feeling of uncertainty leads to 
continued checking. That is what the theory suggests. As you 
can see, it is very easy therefore to get caught in a vicious cycle 
of checking. Do you have any questions about that? Does it 
make sense to you? 
c. Research support: This theory has been supported. It’s 
important to scientifically test theory so we can know whether 
our hunches are true or not, so that we can be more confident 
that what we’re targeting in treatment will work. A number of 
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different research studies have now shown that it is true that 
the more an individual checks, the less certain they become. 
This work has been conducted many times in laboratories 
across the world (including some here at Concordia), with 
people who have OCD and those that don’t, and using real 
checking tasks, imagined checking tasks and virtual checking 
tasks, and they have all found the same thing. Basically 
participants were taught to check a stove once. They were then 
asked to indicate which knobs they checked, and also how 
certain they were about their answers. All participants were 
highly accurate and very confident in their responses. Then, 
half the participants were told to continue checking the stove 
many more times, and the other half instead checked a sink or a 
light. Then they all checked the stove once more, and were 
asked to indicate which knobs they checked most recently. 
They found that although everyone was still highly accurate, 
those who had kept checking the stove were no longer 
confident, while those who had checked the sink or light still 
reported high levels of confidence in their memories for what 
they had most recently checked. (Draw this out) So you see, 
repeated checking decreases confidence, but not accuracy. So 
even though the participants who had checked no longer felt 
certain, they were actually still correct! Interestingly studies 
have suggested that as few as 2 checks are necessary to start to 
feel uncertain. So what does that suggest about repeated 
checking and the way to feel certain? You might be thinking 
that if you could, it would be really better to not check at all.  
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Research has supported the other part of the cycle as well. 
In that study (conducted here at Concordia), participants 
completed a memory test and were either told that they did 
very well or very poorly. Subsequently they completed some 
tasks and were asked about their urges to check. We found that 
participants who now believed they had a bad memory had 
greater urges to check than those who now believed that they 
had a good memory, even though the groups did not differ at 
all on actual memory ability. (Draw this out) So you can see 
that both parts of the paradoxical cycle of repeated checking 
are heavily supported by evidence from research. (Draw check 
marks on the cycle) From that we can also draw the conclusion 
that what you think about your memory is probably very 
important in checking behaviour, because if you’re uncertain 
all the time, it’s possible that you don’t think you have a very 
good memory – at least for actions you have completed and/or 
for the final resting state of things you have checked. We know 
that beliefs play a role in many different adaptive behaviours, 
as well as behaviours associated with OCD and other problems. 
Here it seems that beliefs about memory are one important type 
of belief related to checking. Do you have any questions so far? 
Does that make sense to you?  
d. Contributing factors to negative beliefs about your memory: So 
how is it that checking makes you start to feel like you have a 
bad memory? Research has now shown that the act of checking 
seems to reduce certainty because when someone engages in a 
repetitive action such as continually checking, it actually 
changes the type of memory that is being encoded from a 
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distinct event (which is stored in your mind like an 
autobiographical memory, such as the memory of your 10
th
 
birthday) to a more habitual event (which is stored in your 
memory like other procedural memory, such as how to ride a 
bike or tie a shoe). Once the memory is more procedural in 
nature, it becomes more difficult to retrieve (for example, have 
you ever been driving a familiar route and not remembered 
how you arrived at your destination?). So this is one way that 
explains why repeated checking makes you feel like your 
memory is getting worse, because the type of memory that you 
have is changing. This doesn’t mean that your memory is bad, 
in fact, as we saw above, those individuals still had good 
memories, it just led them to think and feel like their memories 
were bad.  
Another linked explanation is that we find that the amount 
vividness and detail of the memory that gets stored memory 
decreases the more habitual it becomes, you’re no longer going 
to be aware of everything that’s going on in your environment 
as you conduct the check and store that in your memory. 
Unlike the first time when you might notice the smell in the 
room, the light quality, how the object you are checking feels, 
and the sound it makes, the more habitual the action, the less of 
this gets encoded. This also makes that memory more difficult 
to retrieve because there is less information associated with it, 
and when you do retrieve it, it seems less real. Again, it’s not 
that the actual memory is bad or incorrect, it’s just its 
difference in type from other memories you might have makes 
you feel like you can’t remember or that you have a bad 
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memory. Do you have any questions about that part? Does it 
make sense? 
D) Discussion of the client’s beliefs about their memory: So what has 
stuck with you so far? Do you think you could give me the take-home 
message/newspaper headline? That’s right so we know that checking is a 
self-perpetuating cycle whereby people check because they are uncertain, 
but the more they check the less certain they become. Factors that 
contribute to people feeling uncertain and like they have a bad memory are 
the fact that the memory changes from an episodic to procedural memory, 
and because the memory has less vividness and detail associated with it. 
So now that you’ve learned about the role that beliefs about 
memory play in checking behaviour, what do you think about how that 
might apply to you? Do you ever check because you are uncertain? What 
do you think about your memory abilities? Do you think you have a bad 
memory? Are parts of your memory better than others?  Which ones?  Is 
that part of why you check sometimes? What do you think about gathering 
some evidence about the true state of your memory ability? Is your 
memory actually good or bad? How would you know if you needed to 
check? What do you think of your memory while you are actually 
checking? Would you be willing to find out now? What do you predict 
that we will uncover? What would it mean to you if we discover that your 
memory was not actually that bad, but that the problem was only that your 
confidence in memory was too low? What would that mean for whether or 
not you would need to check? What would it mean to you if we discover 
the alternative? What would that discovery mean about whether or not you 
needed to check? What would that change for you? If discovering that you 
didn’t need to check would make you check less as you have just stated, 
does it seem like this might be an important and relevant thing to find out? 
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And if you discovered that you did have a bad memory that would also be 
important, because it would show that the checking is probably useful and 
necessary for you to do. Do you think the outcome of this exercise will 
impact your checking behaviour?  
E) Assignment and practice of the between-session exercise: Today’s 
between session exercise will be to get some information about our 
hypothesis that you may in fact have an excellent memory, even though 
you may (sometimes) feel like you do not. This kind of information could 
impact your checking behaviour because it will tell us whether or not it’s 
actually necessary. We will gather evidence during four checks this week 
to see whether the item in question was actually as it was supposed to be 
or not. This is different from looking at past experiences of having left 
something unlocked, on or otherwise unsafe because we’re planning 
something specific to try over the coming days, just as a scientist might 
do.  We will record it using this recording sheet. Then we will have some 
experimental evidence about how good or bad your memory is. Does that 
make sense to you? Does it seem like an important thing to check out?  
What are your predictions? 
Let’s practice doing this together now and recording the items to 
make sure that you understand how to do it. Can you think of some task 
you could complete and check here in session that might cause you some 
anxiety and desire to re-check? What do you predict the outcome will be? 
(Practice checking to see that the door is locked and recording the 
information in the form – stand near the door to make sure the 
participant doesn’t check before they have been asked) Example: Let’s 
go lock this door. Now we’ll come back and write down the date and the 
object we used. Now ask yourself if the door is locked and record your 
prediction. Now check the door. Record whether or not your answer to the 
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previous question was supported. Now write any thoughts and emotions 
you were having just before you checked. Now rate your anxiety just as 
you have been doing during your regular checking monitoring.  
Alright so that’s the exercise. Do you have any questions about it? 
Are you willing to do it? Do you think it will provide us with important 
information? 
I would like you to practice on four separate occasions before our 
next session. Is that feasible? Will you have enough checking instances to 
do so? Will you have the opportunity to write about them? Do you see any 
obstacles to completing this exercise? How can we work around those 
obstacles?  
In addition to this I’d like to give you this handout that we worked 
on together to take home, along with the things we wrote out today. I think 
it’s important that you have a way to review what we discussed. I know it 
was a lot and although it makes sense now, these things can fade over 
time. Will you make time to read this over this week? Great! I’d also like 
you to make time to listen to our session once this week. You can see in 
your handout out there is a place to record when you’ve done this, so you 
can be reminded to do it. Would you like to set a time now together? It is 
extremely important that remember to bring the audio-recorder back as 
you will need it again next week. Thank you. 
Also please continue to monitor your checking and beliefs about 
memory as usual, using the form provided in your booklet.  
F) Wrap up: 
 a. Summarize: Could you summarize today’s session for me? 
b. Most important: What was the one thing you remember best, 
that was either most interesting to hear, or that you’ll take away 
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with you? (ask them to write it down on the bottom of the page 
you’ve been writing on) 
Sample form for between-session exercise: 
Date Item 
to  
Check 
Prediction (just 
before you check) 
about the status 
of object (e.g., 
Locked/Unlocked) 
Emotions Thoughts Max 
Anxiety 
(0-100) 
Was your 
prediction 
correct? 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
Treatment Session 2: 
The purpose of this visit is to collect the between-session exercise and daily 
monitoring form, to assess how successful the homework assignment was and 
complete the usual questionnaires, to complete the second treatment session. 
1) Hand in their daily monitoring form and between-session exercise  
2) Complete the VOCIcheck and the BAMI; Medication and suicidality check-in 
3) Undergo Treatment Session 2 (audio record with two devices) 
 
1) “Do you have your daily monitoring form? Thank you very much for 
completing this. As you know this is a vital part of our study and we appreciate 
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your cooperation, as we could not continue without this part. Did you have any 
difficulties with it this week, or any questions?” 
2) “Please complete these two questionnaires and then we will get started. There 
are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. Please do not spend too 
much time on any one question; usually your first instinct is the best answer. Do 
you have any questions?” (Complete VOCIcheck & BAMI) “I just have a couple 
of more questions before we get started. (If on medication at intake) Have you 
changed your medication or dose since our last appointment?” (If suicidality was 
identified at intake) “Have you been having any suicidal thoughts this week? 
More than usual? Do you have a plan?” 
3) Treatment Session 2 components: (Start audio recorders) 
A) Set Agenda: We are now ready to start today’s treatment session. 
Today we are going to cover five topics. We will start with reviewing 
what we discussed last session (1). Then we’ll have a discussion about the 
results of your between session exercise (2). Then we’ll have talk about 
that feeling like you need to check and the difference between that feeling 
and actually needing to check (3) and then we’ll talk about types of 
memory failures and see if you have them or not (4). We’ll finish by 
discussing and practicing a between-session exercise (5) that I will ask 
you to complete before our next session (this is important, because it will 
help you make the most of our in-session conversation). (Draw out items 
for them) Does that sound alright? Do you have any questions? Is there 
anything I’ve said with which you disagree? 
B) Bridge from last session and review of the between-session exercise: 
Okay let’s get started then. Last time we talked about the self-perpetuating 
cycle of checking – that even though individuals check to become more 
certain, the act of checking itself actually reduces certainty, and that it’s 
uncertainty that leads to more checking. We also talked about research that 
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shows that it isn’t actual performance that’s impaired, just confidence in 
that performance. We said that these beliefs about your memory abilities 
are influenced by the change in type and depth of memory that occurs 
through checking. Then we talked about your own beliefs about your 
memory ability and the need to gather evidence over it. So we agreed on a 
between-session exercise to test it.  Do you have any questions about our 
last session? 
C) Review of the between-session exercise: How did the between-session 
exercise go? What happened? Did you have any difficulties? If so, how 
can we remove those obstacles for the next exercise?  
What were the results? What did you learn from it? How can you 
apply this moving forward? Does this change the way you think about 
your memory? Was it worthwhile to do? If these results showed that you 
didn’t need to check, even though you felt like you did, what does that 
mean about you? What does this mean about the difference between 
actually needing to check and just feeling like you do? What does that 
mean about what you thought previously about your memory abilities? 
What do you think about your memory abilities now? Does that change 
anything about how you’ll act going forward?  
D) So regardless of how you feel from last time, if you feel now like you 
have a good memory but just can’t stand the feeling, or if you’re still 
not sold on whether or not you think you have a good memory, we 
probably need to have a discussion about that and then gather more 
evidence to really solidify what we’ve been doing together. What do 
you think? 
E) Discussion of the discrepancy between beliefs about memory and actual 
memory ability: As we discussed last time, research shows us that even 
though individuals in the study felt unconfident about their check, like 
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they couldn’t remember and wanted to check, they actually did not need 
to. This shows that how we feel about our memory/the check, and the 
actual state of the check are not actually the same thing, i.e., just because 
you feel you need to check, doesn’t mean that you actually left something 
in an improper way, your feelings are misleading you into thinking that 
you did. Is there anything about this that might apply to you? Did the 
results of your between-session exercise fit with that idea? What do you 
think about that? Have you ever felt that something was true, when it later 
turned out not to be true?  Have you ever had a bad dream and felt that it 
was true?  Can you rely on your feelings of uncertainty to give you a true 
indication of the state of things? This is the idea that you might believe 
that you have a bad memory, but you don’t actually have one. Remember 
how in the first session we discussed that study where all the people who 
checked a lot thought they were reporting the wrong answer, but they 
weren’t actually? And how that other study showed that if people thought 
they had a bad memory to begin with they would want to check more? 
What does this mean about the difference in belief about your memory vs. 
your actual memory ability? How might this apply to you? This shows that 
our beliefs might actually not be correct, and that our feelings that tie to 
these beliefs might not actually be correct. Maybe we could gather some 
extra evidence to see if how you feel should be indicative of the actual 
state of your memory, or if it should be ignored. In any case, more practice 
and more evidence will help you deal with that uncomfortable feeling, and 
trust your knowledge of your memory ability over your feelings about it. 
F) What an actual bad memory looks like: Now you still might think you 
have a bad memory, despite the results of our first experiment, and you 
might need to see more evidence to help you feel more comfortable with 
this new idea of your memory being good and therefore you not needing to 
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check, so that you can ignore that feeling that you have despite evidence to 
the contrary, and help strengthen the idea that the feeling you have is not 
necessarily a correct belief. If you had a bad memory how would you 
know? What would your life look like? You’d presumably have trouble 
with a lot of things, not just items related to checking. What do the lives of 
people with bad memories look like? How would their daily lives be 
different? Is your life like that?  
There are actually three types of memory (draw this out): There’s 
semantic memory, which is memory for stuff you know but don’t 
necessarily remember learning, like the capital of Canada, the colour of 
the sky. Do you know that kind of information? Do you often forget it?  
There’s also procedural memory. This is memory for how to do 
things, like how to tie your shoes or how to ride a bike or drive. Have you 
forgotten any of that recently?  
Finally, there’s episodic memory, which is memory for events. Are there 
recent important events in your life that you have absolutely no memory 
of? Do you remember anything about any recent trip to the grocery story? 
Any recent time you brushed your teeth?  
Huh, so what does that say about the likelihood that you actually 
have a bad memory? Now what is it that you do that makes you think you 
have a bad memory? Oh it’s checking. Do you think that the lives of 
individuals with bad memories are characterized by checking? You might 
be surprised to know that it is not one of the symptoms of a bad memory. 
People with bad memories don’t even know that they need to check! Their 
lives are more likely to include the previous failures we talked about, 
forgetting entire events, not remembering facts about the world, and 
forgetting how to take care of their own basic needs, like how to take a 
shower and brush their teeth. If that’s what someone with a bad memory’s 
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life looks like, and it’s not what yours looks like, what does that say about 
your memory? Okay, and if your memory isn’t so bad after all, what does 
that say about your need to check? Does that make it more likely that you 
just have a feeling that you have a bad memory, rather than it being likely 
that you actually have a bad memory?  
G) Assignment and practice of the between-session exercise: Okay so 
what have we talked about so far today? We’ve talked about how there’s a 
difference between the belief you might have about your memory and your 
actual memory ability, and therefore that even though you might feel like 
you need to check, you might not actually need to, but that we might need 
more evidence to help you ignore that feeling that you do, and the 
uncomfortable anxiety that comes with it. We also talked about what a bad 
memory looks like and how that doesn’t really fit with your life. But I 
understand that it can be hard to ignore that feeling, so let’s gather some 
more evidence about the difference between the feeling and the actual 
need to check.         
 How could we gather that evidence in a new way? We need to 
gather some evidence to test out this idea that you don’t have a good 
memory just because you feel you don’t, i.e. that your feelings about your 
memory are not a good indication of your memory abilities. We need more 
evidence to help you ignore that feeling. Especially as we just saw from 
our conversation about memory, it doesn’t seem to be that you lack 
actually memory ability, in terms of the different types of memory and 
memory failures that exist, but that you can’t help feeling like you have a 
bad memory. We should also double check those abilities as well, as part 
of the exercise. I have an idea of how we can test that this week. Would 
you be interested in trying it? I’m going to give you a light switch, and I’d 
like you to switch it on and off four times this week. Also if your 
128 
 
 
prediction is that you don’t need to check, you don’t need to follow it up 
with a check. You could just leave it as is. 
How confident do you think you’ll feel about the status of this? If 
it turns out you feel okay about it and they were as they should have been, 
how is that different from the other things that you check? What would 
that mean? If it turns out you are bad at it that would also be important to 
know. What would that mean about your checking? We will also monitor 
whether you remember doing it, and remember how to use it, and that will 
show us about whether your memory is actually like someone who has a 
bad memory or not. Do you think you’re likely to forget what this object is 
called? Do you think you’re likely to forget that you actually checked 
them? Do you think you’re likely to forget how to use them? Would 
learning that help us to see if you experience the type of memory failures 
that are truly indicative of a bad memory, rather than just feeling like you 
have a bad memory? So in that case this really would be important 
information to have. 
I’d like you to record, before using the object how certain you 
were about it, and how you expect it to be, how you expect your memory 
for it to be, and how you actually find them (in addition to writing your 
thoughts, emotions, and rating your anxiety). Then we can see if you 
really do have a bad memory, of if it’s just that your feelings about your 
bad memory make you feel that you do. Let’s try it now together so you 
can see how it’s done and how to write about it. (Practice and fill out form 
together.) 
Do you see any obstacles to completing this exercise? How can we 
work around those obstacles?  
Also please continue to monitor your checking and beliefs about 
memory using the form provided.  
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Here is the form for monitoring your between-session exercise. 
In addition to this I’d like to give you this handout that we worked 
on together to take home, along with the things we wrote out today. I think 
it’s important that you have a way to review what we discussed. I know it 
was a lot and although it makes sense now, these things can fade over 
time. Will you make time to read this over this week? Great! I’d also like 
you to make time to listen to our session once this week. You can see in 
your handout out there is a place to record when you’ve done this, so you 
can be reminded to do it. Would you like to set a time now together? It is 
extremely important that remember to bring the audio-recorder back as 
you will need it again next week. Thank you. 
H) Wrap up: 
 a. Summarize: Could you summarize today’s session for me? 
b. Most important: What was the one thing you remember best, 
that was either most interesting to hear, or that you’ll take away 
with you? (get them to write it in the space provided) 
Sample form for between-session exercise: 
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1)           
2)           
3)           
4)           
 
Troubleshooting: 
If the participant is not convinced that their memory plays a role: Grant that you 
are the expert on research and they are the expert on their own situation. Wonder 
if you’re using different definitions or thinking of different times. Ask if 
regardless it would be important to test it out. 
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Appendix E 
Study 1 Consent Form 
Consent Form    
 
  
  This is to state that I agree to participate in a program of research being 
conducted by Dr. Adam S. Radomsky (adam.radomsky@concordia.ca; 514-
848-2424 ext 2202) in the Psychology Department of Concordia University. 
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to examine beliefs and 
thoughts related to different kinds of anxiety. 
 
B. PROCEDURES 
If I agree to participate in this study, I will be asked to complete a 
questionnaire package. The package should take approximately 45 to 60 
minutes to complete. These questionnaires ask no questions regarding my 
name and they will not be connected in any way with my contact details. I 
am aware that the data collected from these questionnaires will be hosted on 
a Concordia University server, but none of my identifying information will 
be linked to the questionnaires or hosted on the server. Finally, I will be fully 
debriefed about the purpose of the study as well as the hypotheses. For my 
participation, I will receive the opportunity to submit my name in a draw for 
cash prizes, OR course credit if I am part of the undergraduate participant 
pool at Concordia University. I am aware that this study employs a 
standardized protocol for which anxious and depressive symptoms are 
assessed. I will be provided access to a treatment resource manual containing 
information about self-help books and local treatment services. 
 
Finally, I am aware that following my participation, I may be recontacted in 
approximately 4 weeks to complete a second set of questionnaires. These 
questionnaires will also be completed online using the Concordia server. I 
consent ONLY to being re-contacted about these questionnaires. At that time 
I can decide whether or not I would like to participate. 
 
C. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation in this study at any time, without any negative consequences 
whatsoever. I understand that all information obtained will be kept strictly 
confidential and will be stored under lock and key for a period of seven years 
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after which they will be shredded. Access to this information will be made 
available only to restricted members of Dr. Radomsky’s research team. I 
understand that to ensure my confidentiality all data will be coded by 
number only and will be kept separate from my name. I understand that data 
from this study may be published, but that no identifying information will be 
released. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to contact 
our lab at (514) 848-2424, ext. 2199. 
 
Adam S. Radomsky, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Gillian Alcolado, M.A., Graduate Student 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, 
please contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Office, 
Concordia University, at 514-848-2424, ext. 7481 or by e-mail at 
adela.reid@concordia.ca 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND 
THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY 
AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
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Appendix F 
Study 2 Consent Form 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
I understand that I have been asked to participate in a program of research being 
conducted by Gillian M. Alcolado, M.A. under the supervision of Dr. Adam 
Radomsky of the Psychology Department of Concordia University. She can be 
reached by telephone at 514-848-2424 ext. 5965 or by email at 
galcolad@live.concordia.ca. 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to determine the 
usefulness of a brief treatment component for obsessive compulsive checking. 
B. PROCEDURES 
I understand that if I agree to participate in this research my participation will 
consist of 4 or 5 visits to the Anxiety and Obsessive Compulsive Disorders 
laboratory, depending on whether I am randomly assigned to receive the treatment 
right away, or randomly assigned to wait 4 weeks before receiving the treatment. I 
understand that I will be instructed in how to monitor my checking each week and 
expected to do so EVERY DAY for the course of my participation in this project, 
so that the researcher can monitor my progress. 
 I understand that the first visit will be an assessment consisting of a short 
series of cognitive tests, followed by an interview and some questionnaires. I 
understand that I may choose to do the questionnaires on a lab computer, or from 
the comfort of my own home, provided that they are completed within the next 3 
days. I understand that at the end of the first visit I will be randomly assigned to 
begin treatment within a week, or to wait three weeks until I am assessed again 
and that the treatment will start the following week.  
 I understand that the two treatment visits will be approximately one week 
apart and will last about 1 hour each. I understand that my participation will 
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include discussing my checking behaviour, thoughts, and feelings with my 
therapist as well as completing an exercise after each treatment session and 
recording my experiences in a treatment exercise form, so that the researcher can 
monitor my progress. I also understand that I will complete a few short 
questionnaires at each visit so the researcher can monitor my progress. 
 I understand that the final visit will consist of a second series of cognitive 
tests, an interview, and questionnaires that I may again choose to complete in the 
lab or in my home within the next 3 days. I understand that all my information 
is completely confidential. 
 I understand that the study consists of four 1-3 hour visits over the course 
of approximately 4 weeks, or, if I am assigned to the waitlist condition, five 1-3 
hour visits over the course of approximately 8 weeks. 
 I understand that I will be offered compensation of $90 total across all the 
assessments. If I am in the immediate condition, I understand I will be offered $45 
at the pre-treatment assessment and $45 at the post-treatment assessment. I 
understand that if I am in the waitlist condition, I will require an extra assessment 
visit and be offered compensation of $30 at each of my 3 assessment visits, for the 
same total of $90 for all the assessments. I understand I will not be offered 
compensation for receiving the treatment itself. 
 I understand that my clinical assessments will be audio recorded for 
reliability purposes, and that my cognitive assessments will be video-recorded. 
This information will be kept completely confidential and under lock and key and 
only accessible by members of Dr. Radomsky’s research team.  
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
I understand that that the potential risks of participation in this study are that this 
treatment might not work for me or that this treatment will make my OCD worse. 
In the event of either of these unlikely occurrences, the researcher will offer 
treatment resources with no pressure or judgement. I understand that benefits of 
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participation will be to receive a component of treatment for my obsessive 
compulsive checking. 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation at anytime without negative consequences. 
• I understand that my participation in this study is: CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., the 
researcher will know, but will not disclose my identity). My data will be 
identified by number only, kept separate from any of my identifying information, 
and that access to this information will be limited to the members of Dr. 
Radomsky’s research team. 
• I understand that the data from this study may be published but that no 
identifying information will be released.  
• I understand that if I withdraw my participation at any point, data collection will 
cease and no new data will be included. Any data collected prior to my decision to 
withdraw from the study will be retained by the researchers and stored in the 
manner described above. 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT.  I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print)        
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
AGE ______        ETHNICITY ______________________                                  
GENDER M / F 
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If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the 
study’s Principal Investigator Dr. Adam Radomsky of the Psychology Department 
by telephone at 514-848-2424 ext. 2202 or by email at 
adam.radomsky@concordia.ca. 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, 
please contact the Research Ethics and Compliance Advisor, Concordia 
University, 514.848.2424 ex. 7481 ethics@alcor.concordia.ca 
 
